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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relation between cognitive perceptions of management and firm 
valuation. We develop a composite measure of investor perception using 30-second content-
filtered video clips of initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentations. We show that this 
measure, designed to capture viewers‟ overall perceptions of a CEO, is positively associated 
with  pricing at all stages of the IPO (proposed price, offer price and end of first day of 
trading). The result is robust to controls for traditional determinants of firm value. We also 
show that firms with highly perceived management are more likely to be matched to high-
quality underwriters. In further exploratory analyses, we find the impact is greater for firms 
with more uncertain language in their written S-1. Taken together, our results provide 
evidence that investors‟ instinctive perceptions of management are incorporated into their 
assessments of firm value.  
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1. Introduction  
In this study, we examine the relation between investors‟ perceptions of management 
and firm valuation. A large body of literature argues that as humans interact, they form social 
perceptions of others (Adams, et al., 2011). These perceptions provide information that 
people use when attempting to attain their goals (McArthur and Baron, 1983). The 
perceptions are formed rapidly and unconsciously, and they are based on a wealth of non-
verbal information, including gestures, body movement, dynamic facial expressions and eye 
gaze (Rosenthal, et al., 1979; Ambady, Bernieri, and Richeson, 2000). We predict that 
perceptions created from observations of management affect investors‟ assessment of firm 
value.  
We create a measure of perception using a “thin-slice” approach common in social 
vision research. Specifically, we ask viewers to provide their perceptions of CEOs after 
watching 30-second video clips of a CEO‟s initial public offering (IPO) roadshow 
presentation with verbal content filtered out. This filtering isolates the nonverbal visual and 
auditory signals that determine rapidly-formed perceptions. Consistent with our prediction, 
we find a positive association between cognitive perceptions of management and measures of 
firm value throughout the IPO process.  
Our work builds on a body of research that shows investors find value in meeting with 
management. Surveys of investor relations firms and of analysts show direct interactions with 
management are highly sought after (Bushee and Miller, 2012; Brown, et al., 2015). 
Empirical studies confirm the value of such meetings for analysts and investors (Bushee, 
Jung, and Miller, 2016; Green, et al., 2014; Soltes, 2014). There is also evidence of a capital 
market response to managers‟ affect as revealed by vocal cues during conference calls 
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(Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012). Specific to our setting, Ann Sherman testified to the 
U.S. Senate in 2012 that investors primarily attend IPO roadshows “to get a feel for 
[management], because [investors] are not just investing in the idea or the product; 
[investors] are investing or betting on the management team” (Sherman, 2012). We combine 
this evidence with the psychology literature‟s documentation of individuals forming intuitive 
perceptions to argue that investors form perceptions and incorporate them into firm value. 
That is, firms with more highly perceived managers receive higher valuations.
1
  
While we argue that perceptions of management are priced, we know that investors 
have a large amount of verifiable, objective information about the firm. Firm financial reports 
provide historical performance of the firm and detailed biographies that discuss the 
managers‟ experience, education, and general background. This information-rich 
environment is different from that in many psychology studies and may reduce the role of 
basic cognitive assessments. Investors are still likely to form cognitive perceptions of 
managers through interactions, but the investors might focus solely on the “hard” information 
provided in regulatory filings and other disclosures to form expectations of future cash flows. 
This tension suggests the impact of basic perceptions on firm valuation is an empirical 
question. 
Valuation implications are our primary focus, but it is also interesting to consider 
whether any valuation response from investors is rational. If perceptions are an accurate 
measure of manager quality, they should be priced (Drucker, 1954). Prior research has shown 
such perceptions have accurately predicted educational, sales, and medical evaluation 
outcomes, especially when based on dynamic behavior rather than static photos (Ambady, et 
al., 2000; Ambady, Connor, and Hallahan, 1999). It is possible they are predictive in a 
                                                          
1
 Investors could also be hoping that managers will provide additional “hard” information beyond that in the 
registration statement, either intentionally or unintentionally. In fact, it is likely that investors hope to get both as 
these are not mutually exclusive. As discussed later, we have designed our perceptions construct to remove 
potential “hard” information. 
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corporate setting as well. Observing a CEO‟s dynamic behavior may provide information 
about their leadership skills and ability to interact with stakeholders, which are important 
components of the CEO‟s task. Alternatively, the perceptions may not capture information 
about skills which result in longer term value creation. We make no prediction, but 
investigate future returns to assess the rationality of the valuation decisions.   
Our empirical analysis begins by examining the association between basic perceptions 
of management and firm valuation for a sample of 224 US IPOs filed from 2011 through 
2013. We estimate investors‟ perception of management using naïve participants who view 
30-second content-filtered slices of CEOs‟ roadshow presentations. To develop a rich, robust 
measure of perception, we ask participants to assess each CEO‟s competence, 
trustworthiness, and attractiveness on a seven-point Likert scale. These are classic traits 
examined in the psychology and economics literature. We select these traits because they are 
characteristics investors are likely to naturally incorporate when perceiving management. Our 
goal is to prompt raters to consider perception from various angles to make sure that 
idiosyncratic interpretations of a single characteristic or its description do not skew our 
results. We focus our analysis on overall perception, which is created by combining these 
three attributes to provide a composite measure of perception. Each video clip is rated by at 
least 40 participants. We calculate mean ratings of CEO-specific perceptions of competence, 
trustworthiness, and attractiveness, and then average the characteristics for our summary 
CEO-specific measure of perception. This measure is designed to capture investors‟ overall 
instinctive perception of the CEO at the time of the firm‟s IPO.2  
We gain several advantages by using information-rich expressive behavior from CEO 
IPO roadshow presentations. First, the IPO roadshow is the initial major exposure of 
                                                          
2
 Our measure relies on two assumptions supported by prior literature: (1) perceptions based on thin slices of 
behavior are reasonable proxies for judgments based on longer interactions (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992). (2) 
Third party ratings are reasonable proxies for investors‟, given that perceptions are not affected by intelligence 
or effort (Ambady, Bernieri, and Richeson, 2000).    
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management to IPO investors prior to the market‟s initial valuation of the firm, providing a 
clear link between investor perceptions in that period and valuation (Ernst & Young, 2008).
3
 
Second, the use of content-filtered video clips allows us to base perceptions on rich, dynamic 
information about CEOs while controlling for the content of what is being said. Third, the 
IPO setting allows us to focus on younger firms where financial performance is less 
informative and assessment of management is considered more important,
 
increasing the 
power of our tests of the impact of perceptions of management (Kim and Ritter, 1999; 
Chemmanur, et al., 2013).
 4
   
We examine the valuation of perception throughout the IPO period. The valuation 
process begins with underwriters providing an initial proposed IPO price before the roadshow 
presentation. This price is modified based on investor feedback via limit orders after the 
roadshow presentation to create the final offer price. Finally, the firm begins public trading, 
creating a final market value at the end of the first day of trading. We find a positive relation 
between perceptions of management and the IPO firm‟s valuation at all three of these 
valuation points. The relation is robust to the inclusion of important determinants of price 
(i.e., firm, offer, and CEO characteristics such as executive age, gender, and facial width-to-
height ratio). Including perception increases the explanatory power of the final market 
valuation model by 2.3 percentage points.  
In addition to valuation, the matching of firms and underwriters is an important part 
of the IPO process. The literature examining this matching indicates that higher quality firms 
are matched to higher quality underwriters. Accordingly, we predict that higher quality 
                                                          
3
 This survey of institutional investors reports that more than 88% of institutional investors cite the quality of the 
roadshow as a key nonfinancial measure in their buying decisions and that the roadshow is generally “the only 
time a company‟s senior management meets the investor.” 
4
 In support of this, Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) examine venture capital firms‟ reasons for investing in a 
given firm and find that 60% cite managerial quality, while only 27% cite performance to date. While the IPO 
setting increases the power of the tests, the findings are less generalizable to other settings. 
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underwriters will prefer firms with higher perceived managers. Our results support this 
prediction. 
 We next perform several exploratory tests to better understand how perception is 
incorporated during the IPO valuation process, as well as to assess the sufficiency of 
alternative proxies of perception. We first examine the relation between perceptions and price 
revision. If the underwriters fully incorporate their perceptions into the proposed price, there 
would be no relation between perceptions and price revision after the initial proposed price.
5
 
However, reputational concerns may constrain underwriters to focus on more objective, 
verifiable information when valuing issuers, thus underweighting the perceptions. 
Accordingly, underwriters‟ perceptions of management would have a smaller impact on the 
initial proposed price, and perception would impact price revision as underwriters receive 
information from investors during the book building process (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). 
We find that perception is associated with the price revision from the proposed price to the 
closing price on the firm‟s first day of secondary market trading.6  
In our second set of exploratory tests, we examine the role that uncertainty might play 
in the impact of perceptions. We find that the relation between perception and valuation is 
more positive when there is more uncertain language in the firm‟s final prospectus, consistent 
with perception of management being more informative when there is more uncertainty in 
disclosure. This is consistent with work by Milovac and Sanchez-Burks (2014) that shows 
investors are more likely to place value on items such as managerial emotion when 
information is less certain.   
While our preceding tests are attempts to more fully understand the economic 
phenomenon of perception in the market, we also provide some additional analyses on the 
                                                          
5
 Note that this is true whether the underwriters‟ assessment of management exactly matches the market or it 
varies from the market, but in a random way (i.e., noisy, but unbiased assessments). 
6
 However, the results should be viewed with a strong caveat. We cannot observe underwriters‟ perceptions of 
management, thus while our dependent variable is the change in valuation, our independent variable continues 
to be the level of perception.  
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efficacy of an alternative proxy for perception. Specifically, in our third set of tests, we 
examine whether a measure of perception based on static photos would be sufficient to 
capture investors‟ perception of management based on interactions. We find that the video-
based perception measure dominates the photo-based proxy when they are included in the 
same regression. The dynamic measure remains positive and significant at the 5% level or 
better in our main analyses, while the static measure is significantly positive in only one of 
the four models at the 10% level. When we examine the static perception measure on its own, 
we find that it is positively associated with firm valuation at a 5% level but does not 
reproduce the significant relation in the underwriter matching analysis. Overall, a video-
based proxy appears to more completely capture investors‟ perception of management 
interactions. However, if a video-based proxy is not available, a photo-based measure does 
serve as a noisier proxy of investors‟ perception that may find similar results in tests with 
strong, clean research designs. 
We next turn to investigating whether the pricing of perception is rational by 
examining the association between perception and firms‟ subsequent stock returns. If 
perceptions of CEOs capture an aspect of manager quality, perceptions should not be 
correlated with future returns. However, if perceptions are not actually informative in the 
CEO context and investors inappropriately respond to perceptions in the moment rather than 
focusing on more objective information included in the IPO filings, any short-term 
correlation between perceptions and firm value would reverse in future stock returns. 
Using several time periods, we fail to find a robust statistically significant relationship 
between perception and firms‟ post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal returns, suggesting that 
investors rationally incorporated perceptions of management. We then examine the relation 
between perception and two outcomes – future CEO turnover and future return on assets 
(ROA) – as potential reasons for rational incorporation of perceptions into firm value. We 
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find evidence of a negative relation with CEO turnover, but no relation with future 
accounting performance. While the CEO turnover relation suggests perceptions may 
accurately reflect a weaker manager (or at least a bad fit with the current firm), the expected 
shortcomings of a weaker manager are not captured by the accounting performance during 
this period. Given the lack of consistent findings, we advise caution in drawing a definitive 
conclusion.  
We perform extensive robustness tests to confirm that results are not driven by CEO 
gender, rater quality, or rater characteristics, and we find that our results are robust in all 
cases. Overall, the evidence suggests that managers‟ expressive behavior evokes instinctive 
perceptions from investors, and that these perceptions influence investors‟ assessment of firm 
value.    
Our study contributes to several research streams. First, our study contributes to the 
literature examining the impact of perceptions of individuals on economic outcomes. Prior 
and concurrent work estimates perceptions of facial features based on still photos and 
examines their relation to political outcomes, personal loan funding, market reactions to job 
and merger announcements, and CEO compensation (e.g., Todorov, et al., 2005; Duarte, 
Siegel, and Young, 2012; Halford and Hsu, 2014; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2016). We add 
to the literature by examining market pricing implications of perception, using “thin slices” of 
video. These perceptions are based on information-rich excerpts of CEOs‟ dynamic, physical 
behavior that incorporate their mannerisms, movements, and vocal quality in addition to 
facial features, allowing us to capture investors‟ complex yet instinctive overall assessments 
of management.  
Second, we bring additional evidence to the more general literature on whether and 
how management impacts firm market value. A number of studies work to disentangle 
management from the firm by testing for changes in investor behavior around a change in 
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management (e.g., Johnson, et al., 1985; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon, 2012), 
or modeling management characteristics such as education, gender, or founder-status (e.g., 
Cohen and Dean, 2005; Hendricks and Miller, 2014). Our setting and evidence provide an 
alternative and distinct set of findings that imply firm management impacts firm value.  
Third, we contribute to the disclosure literature by examining a disclosure channel 
that includes a variety of nonverbal components. Several studies find evidence of an impact 
of investors‟ and analysts‟ one-on-one meetings with management, implying that information 
may be conveyed through multiple channels (Bushee, Jung, and Miller, 2016; Solomon and 
Soltes, 2015; Green, et al., 2014). Consistent with the potential importance of nonverbal 
behavior, managerial affect conveyed through vocal cues in conference calls contains 
information about financial misreporting and future performance (Hobson, Mayew, and 
Venkatachalam, 2012; Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012). Our study turns to the sensory-
rich channel of roadshow video presentations and finds evidence that valuable information 
about management is conveyed through their nonverbal behavior. 
Fourth, our study contributes to the IPO literature by being the first to examine how 
information learned during the IPO roadshow influences IPO pricing. While practitioners 
have suggested that investors learn valuable, nontangible information from attending an IPO 
firm‟s roadshow (NYSE/NASD, 2003; Sherman, 2012), our study is the first to provide 
empirical evidence of the value of roadshow information, focusing on qualitative 
information.  
2. Setting, motivation, and predictions 
2.1. Perception 
A large body of literature argues that through interaction humans form social 
perceptions of others (Adams, et al., 2011). The ability to form such perceptions appears to 
be adaptive and used as information to guide biological and social function behaviors 
(McArthur and Baron, 1983). Research has found people draw on a wide range of nonverbal 
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information in forming these perceptions including gestures, general body movement, eye 
gaze, gait, posture, facial expression and changes in tone of speech (Rosenthal, et al., 1979; 
Adams, et al., 2011). Although some of these items may be broken into individual inputs, it 
appears that the richest sensory information comes from dynamic, fluid behavior where there 
is multimodal input – particularly visual stimuli (McArthur and Baron, 1983; Ambady, 
Connor, and Hallahan, 1999; Grahe and Bernieri, 1999; Ambadar, Schooler and Cohn, 2005). 
As a package, these nonverbal actions are often termed to be “expressive behavior” (Ambady 
and Rosenthal, 1992). The value of these dynamic situations is not just in providing more 
pieces of information than a static picture, but also in dynamic unfolding of the emotional 
display (Ambadar, Schooler and Cohn, 2005).  
The assessment of expressive behavior appears to be unconscious to the person 
making the evaluation.
7
 There is no evidence of rater fatigue over time or due to increased 
cognitive load, and requiring explicit justification for perceptions can often reduce their 
accuracy (Ambady, Bernieri, and Richeson, 2000). These basic perceptions are akin to 
System 1 thinking processes (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Evans, 2008), which are 
described as more rapid, intuitive, and universal, relative to System 2 thinking processes that 
are slower, controlled, and logical. System 1 processes are the primary response in a given 
situation, which is consistent with the automatic, unconscious nature of perceptions. 
The expressive behavior is potentially an informative, unmanipulated signal about the 
individual‟s true disposition because the behavior is unconscious, difficult for individuals to 
control or suppress, yet easily observed (DePaulo, 1992). Consistent with the potentially 
                                                          
7
 The cognitive schema involved in these decisions remain unclear. While some studies try to isolate individual 
stimuli in an attempt to identify the schema, others argue it is more useful to focus on the predictive power of 
the process as a whole (Adams, et al., 2011). For example, early work on brain imaging appeared to identify 
parts of the brain that respond to facial stimuli.  However, later work found the same areas also respond to body 
movement. Follow-up work showed that body language and facial signals are combined to reach an overall 
conclusion (see De Gelder and Tamietto (2011) for a discussion of this literature). 
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informative nature of this signal, a large body of research shows that “naïve viewers” 8 can 
accurately assess emotional states and long term personality traits, as well as more objective 
traits such as intelligence (Gangestad, et al., 1992, Borkenau and Liebler, 1992; Murphy, Hall 
and Colvin, 2003; Harrigan, Wilson, and Rosenthal, 2004).
9
 In addition, these social 
perceptions can be predictive of longer-term evaluations and performance outcomes, such as 
teacher ratings (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1993), sales evaluations (Ambady, Krabbenhoft, and 
Hogan, 2006), political elections (Todorov, et al., 2005), criminal activities (Troscianko, et 
al., 2004), trial outcomes (Blanck, Rosenthal, and Cordell, 1985), medical student 
performance (Rosenblum, et al., 1994; Tickle-Degnen, 1998), and malpractice outcomes 
(Ambady, et al, 2002).   
In sum, the literature shows that humans gather a wide range of information about 
other humans, much of it unconsciously. This information is richest in a dynamic setting that 
allows viewers to see body language, facial expression and other characteristics, as well as 
the emotional progression of the subject. The perceptions formed during such encounters are 
often accurate, but have the potential to be biased. For firm valuation, the perception 
literature implies that investors are likely to form perceptions of management based on 
dynamic behavior in settings such as a roadshow presentation, and to incorporate these 
perceptions into their firm valuations. Accordingly, we predict firms with more highly 
perceived managers receive higher valuations throughout the IPO process.  
In order for us to test the impact in financial markets using the IPO setting, we need to 
develop a measure for perceptions of management. An ideal measure would use dynamic 
media to capture management in a setting that is consistent with those seen by investors, so as 
to most closely replicate the nonverbal cues present during capital market interactions 
                                                          
8
 A “naïve viewer” is an external judge who has never met or interacted with the subject and who often does not 
even know the situation in which the subject is pictured/filmed. 
9
 Obviously, these studies required measures of the characteristics being judged. Personality characteristics and 
internal states were identified via asking the subjects and/or close acquaintances of the subjects. Intelligence was 
measured using a short test. 
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(Borkenau, et al., 2004, Yeagley, Morling and Nelson, 2007). To create such a measure, 
researchers frequently use a “thin slices” approach. This involves taking several short “slices” 
of a dynamic media and providing these to a naïve judge for rating across several 
characteristics. These thin slices are an effective way of capturing individuals‟ dynamic 
expressive behavior that is the basis for perceptions (Ambady and Rosenthal (1992). In fact, 
such thin slices are equally effective in comparison to much longer video, even when viewed 
by trained raters (Murphy, 2005).  
The primary goal of our study is to examine whether instinctive perceptions influence 
pricing in the IPO process; it is not necessary for the thin slice perceptions to be long-term 
predictive. However, a natural question is whether such pricing of perceptions is rational. 
Consistent with the broader perception literature, perceptions based on thin slices of 
expressive behavior often predict future outcomes. Using segments of behavior ranging from 
as little as 10 to 60 seconds, studies find evidence that judgments of thin slices of behavior 
are associated with longer-term evaluations and final outcomes in a broad range of fields, 
from teaching to sales and even medical practice. (e.g., Ambady and Rosenthal, 1993; 
Rosenblum, et al., 1994; Tickle-Degnen, 1998; Tickle-Degnen and Puccinelli, 1999; 
Ambady, et al., 2002; Ambady, Krabbenhoft, and Hogan 2006).
10
  
Within the setting of CEOs and firm value, it is not clear whether perceptions will 
predict future outcomes. On one hand, the connection between CEOs‟ expressive behavior 
and firm outcomes may not be as direct as for teaching and sales, where the core job 
requirement is direct communication of information to students or potential customers using 
expressive behavior. In contrast, the position of CEO requires assessing investment 
opportunities and making sound operational decisions. Thus, intuitive perceptions may not be 
                                                          
10
 This implies that the initial perception remains influential even when information from subsequent 
interactions is incorporated (e.g., Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979; Rabin and Schrag, 1999). However, our study 
does not attempt to answer whether or to what extent initial perceptions impact later perceptions. 
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relevant for firm value, with any short-term correlation reversing in future stock returns. On 
the other hand, the core component of the CEO‟s task is to lead the company and convey 
their vision to stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, or investors. In this role, 
the perception of the CEO‟s leadership abilities is important to persuade others of their vision 
and motivate necessary actions. This suggests that perceptions of a CEO could predict the 
abilities of the CEO in a variety of firm activities and thus be relevant for firm value.  
2.2. The role of roadshows in the IPO process 
Uncertainty is pervasive throughout the IPO process. Potential investors usually know 
little about the issuer, and the issuer knows neither the interested investors nor their level of 
interest. To reduce this bilateral information asymmetry, an issuer is required to file an SEC 
registration statement that provides extensive information about the firm (Leone, Rock, and 
Willenborg, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2013). After filing, issuers enter into a 
designated quiet period that extends through the completion of the offering. If an issuer learns 
new information during the quiet period, the issuer has a responsibility under the Securities 
Act of 1933 to amend its filing to communicate this information to investors. The registration 
process is designed to provide investors with all the information they need to make an 
informed investment decision in a single document. 
 After filing the S-1, the issuing firm‟s management team promotes the offering via a 
series of roadshows at financial centers (see Fig. 1).
11
 Typically, the firm‟s management gives 
multiple presentations a day to institutional investors over the final two to three weeks of the 
registration period. Management is counseled to only make factually accurate statements that 
coincide with the registration statements (Arcella, 2011). Despite the information being 
repetitive, Ann Sherman testified to the U.S. Senate in 2012 that investors primarily attend 
                                                          
11
 A roadshow is defined under Rule 433 of the Securities Act of 1933 as an offer (other than a statutory 
prospectus or a portion of one filed as part of a registration statement) that contains a presentation made by one 
or more members of the issuer‟s management team. 
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roadshows to observe the managers and “find value in watching them on their feet” 
(Sherman, 2012). The NYSE/NASD advisory committee formed in 2003 to examine the 
fairness of the IPO process expressed a similar view. In considering institutional investors‟ 
selective access to roadshows, the committee concluded: 
[E]ven the opportunity to see and hear senior management may provide 
significant information for an investment decision. Many potential investors, 
both in the IPO and in the aftermarket, having been excluded from the 
roadshow, are not privy to this information. To dispel the perception of 
unfairness, this must change. (NYSE/NASD, 2003)  
Following the committee‟s recommendation, the 2005 Securities Offering Reform 
stated that issuers that conduct roadshows in conjunction with an equity offering are required 
to file an electronic copy of one of their roadshows with the SEC or make a “bona fide” 
electronic roadshow available to unrestricted audiences during the registration period.
12
  
 In addition to providing information to investors, the roadshow also provides the 
underwriter an opportunity to gauge the amount of investor demand that exists for the 
offering (Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). In fact, the majority of final offerings 
price outside of the initially proposed range, suggesting that investors‟ indications of interest 
are often significantly different from underwriters‟ expectations (Cornelli and Goldreich, 
2001, 2003; Lowry and Schwert, 2004). 
2.3. Related literature 
Many studies find evidence of managers affecting firm performance and valuation. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that manager fixed effects are related to firm practices and 
performance, and Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2010) show that CEO deaths 
are correlated with changes in firm profitability, investment, and growth. Johnson, et al., 
                                                          
12
 A bona fide electronic roadshow is defined in the final regulation as “a roadshow that is a written 
communication transmitted by graphic means that contains a presentation by one or more officers of an issuer 
… [that] includes discussion of the same general areas of information … that are written communications. To be 
bona fide, the version need not address all of the same subjects or provide the same information as the other 
versions of an electronic roadshow. It also need not provide an opportunity for questions and answers or other 
interaction.” Refer to Rule 433, “Conditions to permissible post-filing free writing prospectuses,” for additional 
details. 
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(1985) find a relation between executive characteristics and market reaction to their 
unexpected deaths, and Hayes and Schaefer (1999) show that market reaction to managers‟ 
job movements is associated with manager characteristics. Similarly, Adams, Almeida, and 
Ferreira (2005) find that returns are more variable for powerful CEOs, supporting the theory 
that CEO characteristics can influence performance and firm valuation.  
The impact of management on valuation may be greater for young firms, such as IPO 
and pre-IPO firms (e.g., Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). Management characteristics like 
education and experience (e.g., Cohen and Dean, 2005; Higgins and Gulati, 2006), gender 
(Bigelow, et al., 2014), and founder-status (Hendricks and Miller, 2014) impact IPO investor 
interest and valuation. Bernstein, Korteweg, and Laws (2016) provide further evidence that 
investors place significant value on information about management of young firms by using a 
randomized field experiment to show that investors respond more to information about the 
founding team than to firm traction or lead investors.  
This literature assumes that investors somehow observe and incorporate manager 
ability into firm valuation, but it is difficult to directly identify investors‟ assessments and 
match them with the relevant firm valuation because investor perception of management is 
typically not observable. A stream of literature has begun trying to estimate perceptions of 
facial features based on still photos. In the political sphere, Todorov, et al. (2005) find a 
relation between perceptions of political candidates‟ competence and outcomes of political 
races. Duarte, Siegel, and Young (2012) show that perceptions of individuals‟ trustworthiness 
are positively associated with personal loan funding and outcomes. Turning to perceptions of 
management, Rule and Ambady (2008) capture perceptions of power based on still photos of 
46 CEOs, and they find a relation between power and average gross revenue but not CEO 
compensation, controlling for age, affect, and attractiveness. Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
(2016) examine perceived competence and attractiveness of 134 CEOs based on still photos, 
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and they find a positive relation between perceptions and the level of compensation, 
controlling for sales and industry fixed effects. They also examine firm performance, but find 
no relation. Finally, a concurrent working paper (Halford and Hsu, 2014) measures CEO 
attractiveness using an algorithmic analysis of facial structure and symmetry based on static 
photos. They find a positive relation between facial symmetry and the market response to job 
and merger announcements. 
We add to this literature in several ways. First, we investigate market pricing of the 
perception of CEOs, which is a different economic question from all except the Halford and 
Hsu (2014) working paper. Second, we focus on a fundamentally different construct by 
turning to CEOs‟ expressive, dynamic behavior and capturing inherent perceptions of 
managerial traits using video clips. Incorporating CEOs‟ mannerisms, movements, and vocal 
quality as well as facial features results in a rich source of information on which to base 
judgments of management. Third, while many of these prior papers suggest interesting 
relations, they do so with relatively small samples and use research designs with limited 
controls and robustness tests. Our larger sample in a setting where we control for a number of 
items such as firm performance, managerial background and certainty of other information 
allow us the ability to develop a cleaner research design.    
3. Data 
3.1. IPO roadshows 
We use video capture software to obtain IPO roadshows from RetailRoadshow.com, a 
website that posts roadshow presentation videos for public offerings. To comply with the 
2005 Securities Offering Reform, firms provide RetailRoadshow with a “bona fide” version 
of their roadshow. During the final weeks of the registration period, individuals may view the 
roadshow as often as they like. However, once the offering is priced, the roadshow 
presentation is no longer available.  
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3.2. Sample Selection 
We obtain a listing of all U.S. firms that completed an original IPO on NASDAQ or 
NYSE in the United States from March 24, 2011 (the first day we began capturing videos) to 
December 31, 2013. Consistent with prior research on IPO firms, we exclude: financial firms, 
minor offerings (OTC listings and filings less than $10 million), limited partnerships, and 
unit offerings. In addition, we remove firms whose financial information was either 
incomplete or missing. Finally, we exclude firms whose roadshows did not include video, did 
not feature presentations from their management team, or were not captured from 
RetailRoadshow.com. As detailed in Table 1, 224 IPO filings remain in our study after 
applying these criteria. 
3.3. Perceptions of management 
To measure perceptions of management, we follow the thin slice literature and extract 
a brief portion of each roadshow video to examine. The goal is for each thin slice to represent 
the entire behavioral sequence from which it is extracted. To this end, prior research has 
generally extracted three samples from a behavioral sequence rather than use a single excerpt 
(Ambady, Bernieri, and Richeson, 2000). We follow this approach and construct a 30-second 
thin slice using three 10-second excerpts from the first five minutes of each CEO‟s roadshow 
presentation. We take the first excerpt from the beginning and combine it with two 10-second 
excerpts taken two and four minutes after the initial 10-second excerpt has ended.
13
 
 Although we only use 30 seconds from each video, there is still the concern that 
viewers‟ perceptions may be influenced by factual information about the firm conveyed 
during these excerpts. To capture investor perception of management independent of firm 
characteristics, we follow Ambady, Krabbenhoft and Hogan (2006) and content-filter the 
                                                          
13
 An alternative is to take samples from the entire presentation, rather than just the first five minutes. However, 
a linear trend such as fatigue would have a more significant impact on those clips taken from the middle and end 
portions of longer presentations. Our approach removes these concerns while still capturing some of the linear 
trends that might appear in the manager presentations.  
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video. Specifically, we use both a lowpass and highpass filter to remove frequencies that aid 
in word recognition. This process makes the CEO‟s words indiscernible, but preserves the 
sequence and rhythm of their speech.  
 Our goal is to capture the overall perception of the manager. To encourage raters to 
consider the broad construct of overall perception from various angles, we ask for ratings of 
three characteristics that investors are likely to use to assess manager quality: competence, 
trustworthiness, and attractiveness. These are classic constructs in the psychology and 
economics literature, and these attributes provide concrete manifestations of perception for 
raters to consider. Competence, or the ability to do something successfully or efficiently, is 
closely related to the construct of CEO quality. Trustworthiness, or the ability to be relied on 
to do what is needed or right, is another potential component of perception of management. A 
number of studies find a relation between perceived competence and/or trustworthiness and 
economic outcomes, such as political elections, teaching evaluations, compensation, and 
personal loan funding (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1993; Todorov, et al., 2005; Duarte, Siegel, 
and Young, 2012; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2016). Finally, a manager‟s general 
attractiveness could impact assessment of the manager‟s value to the firm, given the evidence 
of a relation between attractiveness and compensation, confidence, perceived ability, and 
market reaction to firm events (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; 
Halford and Hsu, 2014; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2016). We focus on the combination of 
these attributes as the overall intuitive perception of a CEO at the time of a firm‟s IPO based 
on our belief that investors‟ perceptions are formed by information encompassed in multiple 
traits. In addition, while individual raters may have idiosyncratic differences in their view of 
individual traits, the composite measure should help overcome any noise this introduces. 
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We use Amazon‟s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service to analyze each of the 224 thin 
slices created from the roadshow presentations.
14
 This online labor market allows requesters 
to post jobs for an on-demand workforce. Numerous studies provide evidence that MTurk is a 
viable alternative to the traditional lab setting for behavioral research in a variety of fields 
(e.g., Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis, 2010; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011; Mason 
and Suri, 2012; Crump, McDonnell, and Gureckis, 2013). In finance and accounting research, 
MTurk is being used as an alternative to traditional lab experiments (e.g., Rennekamp, 2012; 
Koonce, Miller, and Winchel, 2015; Asay and Hales, 2015), and there is also potential for its 
use to generate a construct not available via archival sources (e.g., Duarte, Siegel, and Young, 
2012). For our setting, psychology research indicates that intuitive perceptions are not 
influenced by intelligence or effort, suggesting that perceptions from a general sample of 
raters is a good proxy for investors‟ perceptions.15  
Table 2 Panel A provides demographic information about the MTurk workers in our 
sample. Of the respondents, 87% are between 18 and 50 years old, and slightly over half 
(53%) are male; 74% identify themselves as Caucasian, and 81% have at least some college 
education (with 51% having college or graduate degrees). As shown in Fig. 2, we ask the 
MTurk workers to use a seven-point Likert scale to provide their perceptions about a CEO‟s 
competence, trustworthiness, and attractiveness after watching each CEO‟s roadshow 
presentation, with each CEO being rated by at least 40 MTurk workers. As Table 2 Panel B 
                                                          
14
 See Appendix A for survey design and implementation details, and Section 5 for robustness tests related to 
rating quality. 
15
 Prior to our MTurk data collection, we gave a pilot survey to 100 students in the Stanford GSB Behavioral 
Lab to pretest our approach. This allowed us to observe raters, ask follow-up questions, and adjust our process 
to reduce misunderstandings and enhance the data validity for the later MTurk data collection. The pretest was 
not designed to generate usable observations, and we did not use the data in this paper. However, when we 
compare our later MTurk ratings to the in-lab ratings for the overlapping sample of 26 CEOs, we find that the 
CEO-component level ratings have a Pearson correlation of 0.91. In addition, in early stages we piloted with an 
in-class survey of MBAs at the University of Michigan. Despite obtaining ratings for only 4 CEOs and 
excluding the audio to control for content (students observed a silent video rather than a content-filtered video), 
we continued to find a high correlation (0.84) between the two sets of ratings. Both comparisons confirm the 
validity of MTurk ratings. 
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describes, the full rating scale is utilized by respondents, with 64% of ratings falling in the 
range of 3 to 5, 17.5% below 3, and 18.5% above 5. We take the average MTurk worker 
rating for each of the CEO‟s characteristics to create the following three CEO-specific 
variables: Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. We then calculate the average of these 
three variables to create a summary CEO-specific variable, Perception.
16
  
Table 2 Panel C provides the distribution of average CEO ratings. Perception ranges 
from 3.00 to 5.00, with 79% of the observations between 3.50 and 4.50. For the individual 
characteristics, Competent (Attractive) has a higher (lower) mean, and Attractive has a larger 
standard deviation, ranging from below 2.25 through 5.00. Table 3 confirms these statistics, 
showing a mean Perception of 4.05, mean Competent of 4.72, and mean Attractive of 3.28. 
Turning to personal characteristics of the CEOs in our sample, we find that the average CEO 
is 51 years old, 4% are female, 14% earned a degree outside the United States, 59% earned a 
postgraduate degree, and 36% are founder-CEOs. For roadshow characteristics, 65% of the 
roadshows are captured from live presentations to investors, and 8% of CEOs are seated 
during their presentations. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Perception and firm value 
Our main prediction is that perception of a firm‟s CEO is positively associated with 
firm value. To measure firm value, we use the log transformation of the firm‟s market value 
of equity at each of the three major pricing points during the IPO process: the proposed offer 
price, the final offer price, and the close of the first day of trading on a public exchange.
17
 We 
                                                          
16
 Results are robust to using the quartile or quintile rank of Perception rather than the continuous measure.  
17
 Prior literature finds that using the log transformation of the market value of equity as the dependent variable 
is preferable both to (1) unlogged market value of equity because of model fit and distributional properties 
(Beatty, Riffe, and Thompson, 2000; Hand, 2003) and (2) price per share because the clustering of issuances 
around a single price (typically $15, per Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt, 2004) results in highly unstable 
results and little explanatory power in a price per share specification. Thus, we follow prior literature and use 
the log of market value as our primary measure. However, if we repeat our main results using price per share 
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then estimate the following pooled OLS regression and double-cluster standard errors by 
industry and week: 
L(MVE_X)i = β0 + β1 Perceptioni + β2 L(Book_Value)i + β3 L(Revenues)i  
+ β4 L(Net_Income)i + β5 L(R&D_Expense)i + β6 L(Sales_Growth)i  
+ β7 Firm_Agei + β8Uncertaintyi + β9 Tone_Roadshowi + β10 Underwriteri  
+ β11 VCi + β12 Big4i + β13 Secondary_Sharesi  + β14 Insider_Retentioni  
+ β15Mkt_Cond_Leveli + β16-22CEO_Characteristics + Fixed Effects + εi       
(1) 
where L(MVE_X) is the natural log of a firm‟s market value of equity calculated at (1) the 
proposed offer price for L(MVE_Proposed), (2) the final offer price for L(MVE_Offer), or (3) 
the close of its first trading day for L(MVE_Final). Perception is our primary variable of 
interest and is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive, as defined in Section 
3.3 and Appendix B.  
 We include several control variables in our model that have been shown to be 
important indicators of IPO firm value. Following Xiao and Yung (2015), we include the log 
transformations of each firm‟s book value of equity, revenues, net income, R&D expense, 
and sales growth.
18
 We also include other nonfinancial measures of firm quality as suggested 
by prior research and appropriate for our setting. Specifically, we include Firm_Age 
calculated as the natural log of 1 plus the firm‟s age at IPO (Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 
2005), Uncertainty as the percent of words in the firm‟s final registration statement that are in 
the uncertain, negative, or weak modal word lists (Loughran and McDonald, 2013), 
Tone_Roadshow as the difference between the number of positive words and the number of 
negative words in the CEO‟s roadshow presentation divided by the total number of words in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(and similarly-adjusted independent variables) or book-to-market value, we continue to find a positive 
significant relation between Perception and IPO valuation. 
18
 Consistent with prior studies, we log transform these variables by taking the natural log (1+value) when the 
original value is positive and –log (1-value) when the value is negative, which retains the negative values as 
well as the monotonic relation of the original values. In addition, to be consistent with the dependent variable 
capturing post-IPO firm value, we adjust the book value of equity to include the value of shares issued during 
the IPO. 
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the CEO‟s presentation (Loughran and McDonald, 2013). 19  Underwriter as the average 
Carter-Manaster ranking of the firm‟s lead underwriters (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Carter and 
Manaster, 1990),
20
 VC as an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm has 
venture-capital backing (Barry, et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991), Big4 as an 
indicator variable for whether the firm has a Big4 auditor at the time of IPO (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986), Secondary_Shares as the percentage of a firm‟s shares being offered that are 
owned by existing shareholders (Brau, Li, and Shi, 2007), Insider_Retention as the 
percentage of a firm‟s total shares that are retained by executives and directors after the 
offering (Jain and Kini, 1994), and Mkt_Cond_Level as the NASDAQ level at the time of a 
firm‟s IPO (Ritter, 1984; Ljungvist and Wilhelm, 2003).  
Finally, we include several CEO characteristics to confirm that Perception does not 
simply capture an observable CEO characteristic previously studied.
21
 Specifically, Female is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is female. Foreign is an indicator 
variable for whether the CEO completed a degree from a non-US university. CEO_Age is the 
natural log of the CEO‟s age. Grad_School is an indicator variable for whether the CEO 
earned a postgraduate degree. Experience is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the CEO‟s prior employer was a publicly traded firm. Founder is an indicator variable for 
whether the CEO is also the founder of the IPO firm. WHR is the facial width-to-height ratio 
                                                          
19
 Results are robust (i.e., coefficients of interest in the main regressions remain significant at the 1% level or 
better) to alternative tone measures: tone of the entire roadshow rather than just the CEO portion, net tone 
excluding negated positive or negated negative words, and net tone scaled by total words rather than just words 
in Loughran and McDonald‟s dictionary. In addition, results are robust to including the intensity of roadshow 
language (strong modal in Loughran and McDonald‟s dictionary) and the extent of forward-looking language 
using several variants of the word list from Li (2010).  
20
 Results are robust (i.e., coefficients of interest in the main regressions remain significant at the 1% level or 
better) to removing the continuous measure of underwriter quality and instead including (1) indicator variables 
based on discrete categories of the average underwriter quality for each firm, or (2) indicator variables for each 
individual underwriter quality level (1 through 9), where a firm with multiple underwriters of different quality 
has multiple indicators set to one. 
21
 Results are robust to excluding CEO characteristics.  
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of the CEO, following Jia, van Lent, and Zeng (2014).
22
 This measure is typically interpreted 
as masculinity, aggression, and/or risk-taking. We winsorize continuous variables at 1% and 
99%, and we include both calendar-year and industry fixed effects (based on the Fama 
French 12-industry classifications) in several of the specifications, as noted in the tables.  
  
Table 4 Panel A presents the results from estimating Eq. (1) for each of 
L(MVE_Proposed), L(MVE_Offer), and L(MVE_Final). Consistent with our main prediction, 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 show positive coefficients for Perception: 0.2793 (t-stat 2.99) for the 
proposed market value, 0.3244 (t-stat 3.00) for the final offer market value, and 0.4050 (t-stat 
3.54) for the final trading market value. The model includes seven CEO-specific 
characteristics, showing that our finding is not driven by these other CEO-specific qualities. 
Rather, this finding is consistent with the NYSE/NASD (2003) IPO Advisory Committee‟s 
statement that “even the opportunity to see and hear senior management may provide 
significant information for an investment decision.” In terms of economic magnitude, these 
results suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in the perception of the CEO is 
associated with a final valuation between 7.2% and 27.9% higher, taking into account a 95% 
confidence interval. 
Panel B of Table 4 provides the results of regressing the three market values on the 
components of Perception. As shown, the coefficients for Competent, Trustworthy, and 
Attractive are all positive, with seven of nine coefficients significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level or better, again providing evidence of a positive relation between perceptions 
of management and firm valuation.
23
 However, our survey measure was designed to capture 
                                                          
22
 Using the best resolution picture on Google Images of the CEO‟s face facing forward with a neutral 
expression, two research assistants measure the width and height of the face using ImageJ software. We use the 
average of the RAs‟ measures as WHR if the difference between the two is less than 5%; otherwise, a third 
rater‟s measures are averaged with the closer of the original two measures.  
23
 While all three attributes have a positive relation with firm value, the results for Trustworthy here and in 
future tests are the weakest. One possible explanation is that investors might rely on monitoring mechanisms, 
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overall perception rather than specific characteristics, so results based on individual attributes 
should be interpreted with caution. 
4.2. Perception and underwriter matching 
In the first major step of the IPO process, firms and underwriters associate by mutual 
choice, with prior research providing evidence that the quality of issuing firms is positively 
associated with underwriter quality (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Fernando, Gatchev, 
and Spindt, 2005). If underwriters rely on their perceptions of a firm‟s manager as valuable 
information about firm quality or as expectations of the market‟s likely assessment of the 
firm, then these perceptions should help explain the underwriter matching that occurs 
between firms and underwriters.
24
 Accordingly, we examine this relation by estimating the 
following pooled OLS regression and double-cluster standard errors by industry and week:
   
Underwriteri = β0 + β1 Perceptioni + β2 Assetsi + β3 Revenuesi + β4 
Profitabilityi 
+ β5 R&D_Intensityi+ β6 R&D_Intensityi + β7 Sales_Growthi + β8 Firm_Agei  
+ β9 VCi + β10 Filing_Sizei + β11 Big4i + β12 Secondary_Sharesi  
+ β13-19 CEO_Characteristics + Fixed Effects + εi       (2) 
Where Underwriter is the average Carter-Manaster ranking of the firm‟s lead underwriters, 
Filing_Size is the natural log of the size of the offering, and the remaining variables are as 
previously defined.
25
  
 Table 5 provides the results from estimating Eq. (2). Consistent with perceptions of a 
firm‟s manager being used by underwriters as an indicator of firm quality, Column 1 reports 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
such as regulators and auditors, to ensure that management is not undertaking inappropriate or fraudulent 
activities.  
24
 Underwriter assessment of quality and prediction of market assessments are related concepts. In the former, 
the underwriter provides an honest personal assessment of firm quality. In the latter, they assess whether the 
market will be interested in the firm at a higher price. Both assessments should help an underwriter predict 
eventual price and the value of being involved in the IPO. 
25
 We model Eq. (2) following Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005), with several adjustments. We exclude the 
market value of equity, five-year survival indicator, secondary equity offering indicator, and number of analysts 
because they are not known at the time of matching. We then supplement the model with additional variables 
known at the time of IPO and believed to be important indicators of firm quality: Assets, Revenues, R&D 
Intensity, Sales Growth, Big4, and Insider_Retention. 
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that the coefficient for Perception is 0.3066 (t-stat 2.32). This benefit is important, given the 
evidence of prestigious underwriters providing all-star analyst coverage, more reputable 
syndicates, and higher valuations (Fernando, et al., 2012). Columns 2 through 4 report 
positive coefficients for Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive, with the first two 
significantly different from zero (t-stats 3.39, 2.08, and 1.25, respectively). While prior 
research has primarily focused on how a firm‟s financial information influences underwriter 
matching (Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2005), our result suggests that an IPO firm‟s 
management team also plays an important role in attracting prestigious underwriters.
26
 
5. Further Exploratory Analyses  
 In the following sections, we perform several additional descriptive analyses to 
explore the documented relation between perception and valuation and improve our 
understanding of it. 
5.1 Perception and price revision 
Perception and the proposed IPO price are positively related, suggesting that 
underwriters at least partially incorporate their perceptions of CEOs in the valuations they 
propose. However, it is not clear if the perceptions are fully incorporated into the proposed 
IPO price, or if the perceptions are initially underweighted and incorporated more fully in 
subsequent pricing stages. Several studies provide reasons why the incorporation might 
increase at each stage. Hong and Page (2004) show that a diverse group of problem solvers 
arrives at a different, better solution than a group with greater ability but less diversity, and 
                                                          
26
 We assume that the perception of management captured during the roadshow is correlated with the perception 
that occurs during underwriter matching. However, underwriter training of management during the IPO process 
could improve the perception of management. If high-quality underwriters provide better communication 
training for management than low-quality underwriters, the positive relation between the perception of CEOs 
and underwriter quality could be partly due to underwriter training rather than underwriter matching. We control 
for pre-IPO training possibilities, such as interaction with venture capital firms and the prior public firm 
experience of the CEO, and we repeat valuation tests using alternative underwriter controls, as noted earlier. In 
addition, given the inherent, subconscious nature of the expressive behavior being assessed, it is unlikely that 
individuals could learn to completely control or influence their behavior in the few months of underwriter 
interactions before an IPO (Ambady, et al. 2000).  
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Eisenkraft (2013) finds that a group of raters‟ aggregated intuitive assessment of a thin slice 
of expressive behavior is more predictive than individual raters‟ assessment of an interview. 
Thus, the greater number and diversity of investors versus underwriters could result in 
meaningful differences in perceptions of management. Given the inherent noise in 
underwriters‟ proxy for market perceptions, these perceptions may be purposely 
underweighted in the proposed price. Consistent with the idea of purposeful underweighting, 
Roosenboom (2007) shows that underwriters often discount softer or less certain information 
due to reputational concerns. Thus, underwriters and investors could impound this soft 
information into price adjustments during the book building process.  
We examine the price revision that occurs from the proposed price to the closing 
market price on firms‟ first day of trading. We caution, though, that this test regresses a 
change in price (Revision) on a level (Perception). Ideally, we would incorporate the 
underwriter‟s perception, as well as any difference between underwriter and market 
perceptions, to examine whether and how perception and changes in perception influence the 
price revision during the roadshow. Because this information is not available, we use 
Perception as the proxy, but we recognize that it reduces the strength of the test and 
recommend caution in interpreting the results. We estimate the following pooled OLS 
regression, double-clustering standard errors by industry and week: 
Revisioni = β0 + β1 Perceptioni + β2 Assets + β3 Revenuesi + β4 Profitabilityi  
+ β5 R&D_Intensityi + β6 Sales_Growthi + β7 Firm_Agei + β8 Uncertaintyi  
+ β9 Tone_Roadshowi + β10 Underwriteri + β11 VCi + β12 Filing_Sizei + β13 Big4  
+ β14 Secondary_Shares + β15 Insider_Retentioni + β16 Mkt_Cond_Changei + β17-
23CEO_Characteristics + Fixed Effects + εi           (3) 
where Revision is defined as the percentage change between an issuing firm‟s closing price 
per share on its first day of trading on the secondary market and the price per share initially 
proposed. Mkt_Cond_Change is the average daily change on NASDAQ between the date 
when the firm filed its initial registration statement and the offer date. This variable captures 
new information about the macroeconomic conditions that arise during this period and has 
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been shown to be a powerful determinant of the price revision (Lowry and Schwert, 2004). 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
 Table 6 provides the results from estimating Eq. (3). Consistent with investors 
providing additional information about perceptions of management during the book building 
process, the coefficient for Perception in Column 1 is 0.2205 (t-stat 2.70). To gain further 
insight into this result, we decompose Revision into two components: the change from the 
proposed to the final offer price (Price_Update) and the change from the final offer price to 
the closing price on the first trading day (Initial_Returns).
27
 As shown in Columns 2 and 3, 
the coefficients between Perception and each of these two subcomponents (Price_Update 
and Initial_Returns) are positive, with Initial_Returns significantly different from zero (t-
stats 1.34 and 1.84, respectively). Overall, this evidence suggests that perception continues to 
be incorporated into firm value estimates throughout the book building process.
28
  
5.2. Perception and Uncertainty 
 We next examine a setting where we expect perception to be more important for firm 
value. Firm communication during the IPO process begins with the S-1, and this written 
disclosure is followed by the oral roadshow presentations. Prior research has shown that 
variation in the level of uncertainty in this document impacts the valuation process (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2013). We argue that when there is greater uncertainty in the written 
disclosure, the subsequent communication of the roadshow and the perception of 
management is likely to be more important for assessing firm value.  
                                                          
27
 Although we tabulate results for each partition of Revision, we caution against making conclusions about 
which investors are incorporating the perceptions. Prior literature finds that information revealed during 
bookbuilding is not fully impounded into the offer price (Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Hanley 1993; Lowry and 
Schwert 2004). This suggests that even if institutional investors incorporate perception fully into their limit 
orders, underwriters may choose not to fully impound this information into the final offer price. In that case, 
institutional investors‟ perceptions would “spill over” into the revision during the first day of trading.  
28
 A positive Perception coefficient in Initial_Returns could suggest welfare implications for the firm as well, 
i.e., firms with more highly perceived CEOs may not be able to capture as high a proportion of the benefit these 
CEOs bring during the IPO process. However, the allocation of funds between the firm and initial investors is 
complicated due to incentives of firms and/or underwriters to intentionally underprice firms. Disentangling 
welfare implications of the CEO perception is beyond the scope of our analyses. 
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 To test this, we re-estimate Eqs. (1) and (2), substituting an indicator for filings with 
highly (top quintile) uncertain language in the registration statement (High_Uncertain) in 
place of the continuous Uncertainty, and including the interaction 
Perception*High_Uncertain. As shown in Table 7 Panel A, the interaction of Perception and 
High_Uncertain is positive for all models and significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level or better for three of the four models. The Perception*High_Uncertain coefficient 
ranges from 0.3510 (t-stat 1.64) to 0.5417 (t-stat 2.40), while the coefficient on Perception 
for firms without high uncertainty is smaller at 0.1663 (t-stat 1.83) to 0.2538 (t-stat 1.71). 
These findings suggest that investors value the perception of management approximately 
twice as much when there is high uncertainty surrounding a firm‟s written disclosures. 
However, we caution against drawing strong conclusions given the difficulty in measuring 
investors‟ ex-ante uncertainty.  
 As an additional test exploring perception and uncertainty, we examine the relation 
between perception and post-IPO return volatility. Loughran and McDonald (2013) find that 
uncertain language in the S-1 is positively associated with return volatility in the 60-day 
period just after the IPO. Because perception is more relevant for valuation when the firm‟s 
written disclosure is more uncertain, another potential outcome of high perceptions is the 
reduction of capital market uncertainty in the period just following the IPO. Using a model of 
post-IPO uncertainty similar to Loughran and McDonald (2013), we find (untabulated) that 
Perception is negatively correlated with post-IPO stock volatility, with a coefficient of -
0.4216 and t-statistic of 2.49.
29
 Overall, these findings suggest that perception of management 
might be another way in which investors resolve uncertainty. 
                                                          
29
 Specifically, we regress the standard deviation of the firm‟s stock returns in the 60-day post-IPO period (+5, 
+64) on the firm‟s perception, price update, VC indicator, underwriter quality, revenues, sales growth, 
profitability, roadshow presentation tone, market condition change, firm linguistic uncertainty, share overhang, 
and market volatility, as well as year and industry fixed effects and standard errors double-clustered by industry 
and week. Consistent with Loughran and McDonald (2013), we also find that Uncertainty is positively 
associated with post-IPO return volatility (coefficient 0.5094, t-stat 1.80). 
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5.3. Measurement of perception - videos and pictures 
 Our primary measure of perception is based on ratings of thin slices of dynamic, 
information-rich video of management. We choose this approach due to prior literature‟s 
findings of the wealth of information in expressive, dynamic behavior. This information 
enables the creation of a rich, ecologically valid proxy for the interaction that actually 
occurred. However, an alternative basis for the measurement of perception is a static picture. 
A number of papers in finance and economics use static pictures to capture perceptions of 
individuals in other settings (e.g., Todorov, et al. 2005; Duarte, Siegel, and Young 2012; 
Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2016), and static pictures are more broadly available and lower 
cost to use. Thus, two questions exist. First, do perceptions formed by viewing dynamic 
behavior provide additional insight over perceptions based on static pictures? Second, would 
perceptions based on static pictures be sufficient to capture the underlying construct of 
investor interaction with management?  
 To test these questions, we obtain pictures of all 224 CEOs and repeat the same Mturk 
surveys of perception of the three attributes, using pictures rather than video clips. The survey 
instrument and procedures are identical to those used for the main perception of video clips, 
except for wording changes in the survey to replace video (and related terms) with picture 
(and related terms). Thus, each picture was rated on the same three attributes by at least 40 
individual raters per CEO.  We refer to this picture-based perception as Perception_Pic. 
We address question one by including both the dynamic- and static-based perception 
measures in a single regression. Ex-ante there are several possible outcomes. We may find 
that both variables consistently explain some portion of the variation in price, suggesting they 
capture different components of perception. Alternatively, we may find that one measure 
consistently explains valuation, while the other is less useful. That would suggest the 
consistent measure is a better construct for capturing market perceptions. As shown in Table 
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8 Panel A, we continue to find a positive significant relation between Perception and the 
valuation levels and underwriter quality, even after including Perception_Pic. In contrast, 
Perception_Pic has a significant positive coefficient in only one of the four specifications. 
Thus, the evidence suggests that perception based on video clips is the superior proxy for 
individuals‟ perceptions of management.  
 We appreciate that there are times when researchers may only have static evidence to 
create proxies for perceptions based on interactions. This leads us to the second question of 
whether perceptions based on static pictures would be sufficient to capture our construct. 
Simple correlation tests suggests that the dynamic- and static-based perceptions share some 
variation. The overall rating (Perception_Pic) has a mean of 4.17, median of 4.2, and 
standard deviation of 0.41, similar to Perception, and the two measures are positively 
correlated (0.5224). As shown in Table 8 Panel B, when we repeat our main tests using only 
Perception_Pic, the static perception has a positive and significant coefficient in three of the 
four main tests. For those three tests, though, the significance is slightly weaker than for 
Perception (t-stats of 2.13 to 2.49 rather than 2.99 to 3.54). Based on this second test, we 
conclude that perception based on static pictures captures some portion of the market 
perception construct, but with additional noise. Thus, it appears that static pictures may serve 
as a proxy when dynamic videos are not available. However, researchers should be aware that 
static-based measures are likely a lower power construct for creating a measure of 
perception.
30
  
5.4. Post-IPO performance 
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 Of course, static pictures may be the preferred approach if they capture the experience that would actually 
occur in the research question. For example, Pope and Sydnor (2011) study biases in on-line lending. Their 
research question addresses the impact of a picture that shows an applicant is African-American. In that setting, 
a picture would obviously be the appropriate construct. Similarly, Duarte, Siegel, and Young (2012) examine 
perceptions of online borrowers, again using pictures because they are the actual evidence available to online 
lenders making decisions.  
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 Our finding that perceptions of management are positively related to firm value raises 
the question of whether investors are rationally pricing this information about firms.  This is 
difficult to test empirically as there is not an obvious time horizon to examine for an 
unraveling of the valuation premium. Despite these limitations, we examine the association 
between Perception and subsequent returns for our sample of firms. Specifically, we re-
estimate Eq. (3) using BHAR2Y as the dependent variable, where BHAR2Y is firms‟ post-IPO 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the subsequent two years minus the buy-and-hold returns 
earned by that firm‟s Fama-French 10x10 portfolio (i.e., the matrix of 100 portfolios formed 
on deciles for the market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio) over the same 
period.
31
 Control variables are included similar to the price revision model (Equation 3) and 
are as defined in Appendix B. While a two-year post-IPO horizon is admittedly ad hoc, we 
choose this period of time for two reasons. First, our sample concludes at the end of 2013, 
making two years the longest horizon we are able to examine for the entire sample. Second, 
using a two-year horizon allows two prominent features that impact the secondary market 
pricing of IPOs to expire (insiders‟ lockup provisions (Field and Hanka, 2001) and 
underwriters‟ overallotment options (Lewellen, 2006)), removing concerns that the final price 
is not a true market price.  
 As Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 Panel A shows, we fail to find a statistically 
significant relation between perception and post-IPO stock returns, whether or not control 
variables are included (t-stats 1.12 and 0.32). This suggests that incorporating perceptions of 
management into firm value during the IPO process was either rational, or at least that 
investors did not unwind the pricing of perception during the two years after the IPO. As 
shown in Columns 3 and 4, we continue to find no evidence of a relation with future stock 
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 Results are robust to using raw returns or CRSP value-weighted returns instead.   
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performance when we expand the BHAR period to the maximum post-IPO period available 
for each firm (three years for the average firm).
32
  
To better understand why perception would be rationally incorporated into price, we 
examine several avenues. First, we test whether CEOs with worse perceptions are more likely 
to experience turnover after the IPO. If the perception of the CEO captures some aspect of 
manager ability, low perception could predict future job loss. As shown in Table 9, Panel B 
Columns 1 and 2, there is no evidence of a relation between perception and CEO turnover in 
the two years after IPO (t-stats 0.15 and 0.27). However, columns 3 and 4 expand the post-
IPO period to all available years (which is three years on average), and in this slightly longer 
time period, we find a significant, negative relation between perception and future CEO 
turnover (t-stats 2.15 and 1.82 for models without and with control variables). Perception‟s 
ability to predict which CEOs retain their jobs suggests that it captures meaningful aspects of 
manager quality and provides one reason for the market‟s incorporation of perception into 
price. 
As a second test, we explore why poorly perceived CEOs might need to be replaced in 
the future: poor subsequent performance. As a proxy for poor performance, we examine 
subsequent accounting performance (i.e., two-year post-IPO cumulative return on assets 
(ROA2Y)). As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 Panel C, we do not find evidence of a 
relation between perception and future ROA (t-stats 0.32 and 0.25). When we extend ROA to 
include all future periods for each firm (Columns 3 and 4), we again do not find evidence of a 
relation. These results do not provide a reason for the rational incorporation of perceptions 
into long-run price or the subsequent turnover of poorly perceived CEOs. However, it is 
possible that a difference in value due to perception would not manifest in ROA within a few 
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 Although CEO turnover is a binary variable, we estimate the CEO turnover model using OLS due to the 
difficulty of incorporating fixed effects in probit models. However, when we repeat the analysis using a probit 
model, we find similar results for both periods under consideration.  
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years of the IPO. IPO firms are typically young and unprofitable when going public (Barth, 
Landsman, and Taylor, 2016) and are still maturing several years post-IPO. In summary, we 
do not find evidence of a stock price reversal in the years after the IPO, suggesting that 
perceptions are rationally included in price. Although future performance does not emerge as 
a mechanism or reason for the market‟s incorporation of perception into price, we do find 
evidence of perception affecting CEO employment duration as well. 
6. Additional analyses  
6.1. Determinants of perception 
Another interesting area for analysis is examining the determinants of Perception. Our 
motivation for this analysis is to investigate how CEO, roadshow, and firm characteristics 
influence perceptions of management, and to confirm that these perceptions are more 
strongly associated with CEO characteristics than with roadshow or firm characteristics. To 
do so, we estimate the following pooled OLS model: 
Perceptioni = β0 + β1 Femalei + β2 Foreigni + β3 CEO_Agei + β4 Grad_Schooli  
   + β5 Experiencei + β6 Founderi + β7 WHRi + β8 Livei + β9 Sittingi  
   + β10 Backgroundi + β11 Assetsi + β12 Profitabilityi + β13 R&D_Inteni  
   + β14 Firm_Agei + β15 VCi +Fixed Effects + εi                    (4) 
where Perception and the CEO characteristics are as previously defined. We also include 
variables relating to the roadshow presentation that could influence investor perceptions. Live 
is an indicator variable for whether the retail roadshow appears to be recorded from an actual 
presentation made to institutional investors. Sitting is an indicator variable for whether the 
CEO is sitting during the presentation. Background is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if an investment bank‟s logo is visible in the background during the CEO‟s 
presentation. Finally, we also include several firm characteristics in our model. If higher-
quality CEOs match with higher-quality firms, then it is possible that firm characteristics will 
be informative about Perception. Variables are as defined in Appendix B.  
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 Table 10 Panel A provides the results of estimating Eq. (4). Columns 1, 2, and 3 
present the results of regressing Perception on the CEO-specific, roadshow presentation, or 
firm characteristics, respectively. Consistent with perceptions about an individual being 
primarily determined by individual-specific information, we observe that the adjusted R-
squared is much larger in Column 1 than in Columns 2 and 3. Further, Column 4 includes all 
the variables and indicates that six of the seven significant variables are CEO-specific 
variables. Specifically, CEO_Age, Foreign, Founder, and WHR are all negatively associated 
with Perception, while Female and Grad_School are both positively associated. Table 10 
Panel B provides the determinants at the attribute level. The relations previously noted are 
similar across attributes, with some differences in statistical significance. Overall, Table 10 
provides new insight into how a CEO‟s personal characteristics influence investor perception. 
In addition, the adjusted R-squared of only 0.272 highlights the fact that investor perception 
encompasses more than just observable characteristics, which is consistent with our findings 
of a relation between perception and firm value even controlling for these characteristics.     
6.2 Selection Concerns 
 When examining the relation between CEO perception and firm valuation, a potential 
concern is the existence of correlated omitted variables or endogenous matching between 
firms and CEOs. If the observed relation between perception and valuation is driven instead 
by another variable such as the quality of the firm, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
role of CEO perception. However, our research design and observed results mitigate such 
concerns. 
Our research design was created to ex-ante address potential confounding variables. It 
includes an extensive set of controls for firm, CEO and environmental variables such as firm 
performance, underwriter and auditor quality, market conditions, information content of 
roadshows, etc. To the extent that our perception variable is somehow proxying for one of 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
these items, or some combination of them, inclusion of the control variables should remove 
any correlation.   
Turning to our observed results, several findings suggest that correlated variables or 
endogenous matching are not the primary driver of our findings. First, we find evidence of 
higher future job turnover for more poorly perceived CEOs. This evidence is consistent with 
Allgood and Farrell‟s (2003) findings of frictions in firm-CEO matching that result in high 
CEO turnover in the early years of tenure.
33
 In our sample, this suggests that not all CEOs 
were ideally matched at the IPO date and that the market appears to assess these CEOs 
distinct from the firm.  
Second, in our analysis of the determinants of perception, the majority of the 
correlations observed are with CEO characteristics. Very few firm or event characteristics are 
correlated with CEO perception. This again indicates that firms and CEOs are not perfectly 
matched based on perception of the CEO. Even observable CEO characteristics found to 
matter for firm value in prior studies explain only a portion of perception (R-squared of 
0.249), and the relation between perception and valuation remains after controlling for these 
characteristics. Finally, we find that perception is not only related to valuation and 
underwriter matching, but also to price revision. Additionally, we find the relation varies 
based on the firm uncertainty. This pattern of findings is consistent with our interpretation of 
perception and its role in the market. If the valuation relation is driven by some other 
correlated omitted variable, that variable would need to explain this larger set of results as 
well, which becomes less likely. The combination of these research design choices and 
results reduce the likelihood that the observed relation between perception and valuation is 
due to firms selecting CEOs of the same quality or other correlated omitted variables.   
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 The classic assumption in the assortative matching literature of firms and managers perfectly matching has 
been questioned by a number of papers. Suggested frictions preventing perfect matches include geographic 
segmentation and local hiring bias (Law 2016, Yonker 2016), a minimum length of time or stability to create the 
match (Mendes, van den Berg, and Lindebook 2010), and the need to optimize over several firm and CEO 
characteristics (Pan 2015).  
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7. Robustness tests 
7.1. Gender of CEO 
 In the psychology literature on perception, the gender of the subject is often raised as 
a consideration or a conditioning variable. Accordingly, studies not specifically studying 
gender often choose to examine only one gender, especially in the corporate setting where the 
majority of CEOs are male (e.g., Rule and Ambady, 2008; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2016). 
In our primary results, we include both male and female CEOs. However, to ensure that our 
findings are not affected by gender considerations, we repeat our analyses using the 
subsample of male CEOs. As shown in Table 11 Panel A, the coefficients of interest are 
similar and remain statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
7.2. Results including all attributes individually 
 Our focus throughout the draft is on the overall perception of management, although 
we also tabulate results using the individual attributes separately. An alternative way to 
examine their relation with firm valuation is to include all three attributions within the same 
regression. We provide the primary regression results using this alternative specification in 
Table 11, Panel B. As shown, at least one of the three attributes maintains the positive and 
significant relation, but which one varies somewhat across the specifications, with the 
coefficients on Attractive and Competent being significant more often than Trustworthy. 
Including them all in the same regression enables easier comparison across coefficients and 
significance. However, it also raises the concern of multicollinearity, given the high 
correlation between the individual attributes (i.e., 0.80 Pearson correlation between 
Competent and Trustworthy, 0.46 between Competent and Attractive, and 0.41 between 
Trustworthy and Attractive). Our goal in using the average of the three components is to 
incorporate different aspects of perception, and our focus throughout has been on the overall 
perception. When we perform a principal component analysis of the three measures, we find 
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that one common factor clearly emerges, with an eigenvalue of 2.13 for the principal 
component and loadings of 0.63 for Competent, 0.61 for Trustworthy, and 0.47 for Attractive. 
This provides additional support for the use of the overall factor.
34
     
7.3. Data quality 
Prior research indicates several data-quality concerns may arise when using MTurk to 
perform behavioral research (Mason and Suri, 2012; Crump, McDonnell, and Gureckis, 
2013). In this section, we examine whether these concerns are present in our data and 
investigate their impact on our results. 
We used every rating that we received from the MTurk workers in our calculation of 
Perception, Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. However, some of the MTurk worker 
ratings may be compromised either because the rater recognized the CEO, wasn‟t paying 
close attention, or was engaged in otherwise suspicious behavior (Crump, McDonnell, and 
Gureckis, 2013). This suspicious behavior may include providing the same response to each 
request or providing responses that are uncorrelated with the group average. Accordingly, we 
exclude the ratings that manifest these behaviors from the data and re-estimate each of the 
main regressions in our paper. 
Table 12 provides the results of re-estimating the main regressions in our paper after 
excluding abnormal ratings provided by MTurk workers. Panel A provides the results after 
excluding all ratings where an MTurk worker indicated having recognized the CEO in the 
video. Panel B provides the results after excluding all ratings where MTurk workers failed to 
answer our two attention-check questions correctly. Panel C provides the results after 
removing all ratings where MTurk workers indicated the same value for a characteristic 
across the videos they rated. Panel D provides the results after excluding all raters whose 
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 In addition, if we use the first principal component instead of the average of the three attributes, the first 
principal component has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level for all regressions 
included in our primary analysis (Tables 4-5). 
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ratings were not positively correlated with the group average (p-value < 0.10). Panel E 
provides the results after removing all ratings that were excluded in Panels A-D. In each 
panel, we note that the qualitative inferences made when using the restricted set of ratings are 
identical to those made when using the complete set of ratings.  
7.4. Rater characteristics 
Perceptions are unconscious assessments made without effort or awareness, 
independent of intelligence or working memory (Ambady, Bernieri, and Richeson, 2000; 
Evans, 2008). Because these are fundamental, universal perceptions, we don‟t expect results 
to be driven by rater characteristics. In addition, we follow the content analysis literature‟s 
recommendation to use a large number of raters when capturing variables that involve 
judgment (Neuendorf, 2002), with the goal of estimating a common perception. Thus, we are 
hesitant to estimate perceptions using significantly smaller groups of raters. Nevertheless, we 
repeat our analyses using ratings from various subsamples of raters to examine whether we 
observe this fundamental assumption in our setting. We find qualitatively similar inferences 
for our main tests when using subsamples limited to any of the following demographics: male 
raters, female raters, raters under 30 years old, raters 30 years of age or greater, Caucasian 
raters, non-Caucasian raters, raters that have attended at least some college or have a college 
degree, and raters that have not attended college.
35
 These findings provide support that we are 
capturing fundamental human perceptions that are not unique to any particular demographic.  
8. Conclusion 
This study examines how investors‟ perceptions of management are associated with 
firm valuation. We examine whether perceptions of management, formed from watching 30-
second content-filtered video excerpts of a CEO‟s IPO roadshow presentation, are correlated 
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 Specifically, we continue to find a positive relation between investor perception of managers and proposed 
firm valuation, final offer valuation, final market valuation, and underwriter matching across all subsamples, 
with 29 out of 32 specifications significant at the 10% level or better.  
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with investors‟ assessment of firm value, controlling for known determinants of firm value. 
We find that a composite measure of perception based on competence, trustworthiness, and 
attractiveness is positively associated with an IPO firm‟s market value at the initial proposal 
price date, the final offer date, and the end of the first day of trading. We also examine how 
this information influences IPO price formation process, finding that our composite measure 
of perception is positively associated with underwriter quality and the price revision that 
occurs from the proposed price to the closing price on the firm‟s first day of trading on the 
secondary market. Finally, we find that our proxy of perception based on dynamic behavior is 
preferable to a measure based on static photos, although a photo-based measure does serve as 
a noisier proxy of investors‟ perception. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several areas. First, we provide evidence 
that perceptions of management are associated with timely measures of firm value. Second, 
our study contributes to the literature examining perceptions of management by (1) focusing 
on the market impacts of perceptions and (2) using a construct of perception based on 
information-rich dynamic behavior. Third, our study contributes to the disclosure literature 
by providing evidence that valuable information about management is conveyed through 
visual and auditory nonverbal behavior. Fourth, we contribute to the IPO literature by 
providing the first empirical evidence that investors learn valuable, non-tangible information 
from attending an IPO firm‟s roadshow. 
Although we have a unique setting that allows us to match perception with concurrent 
valuation, three caveats apply. First, when constructing ratings of management, we remove 
contextual information about the firm, firm performance, the history of the CEO, and even 
the fact that the presentation is part of an IPO. Our goal is to focus on the most basic human 
perceptions, irrespective of additional information, and this approach is consistent with the 
vast prior literature of perceptions. However, this means that we do not capture a measure of 
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investor perception that is influenced by the content of conversations or historical information 
about management. Second, we rely on prior literature‟s findings that intuitive perceptions 
are unconscious, automatic, and not easily influenced by outside factors such as cognitive 
load or intelligence. To the extent that these basic perceptions could be influenced by 
financial incentives, our measure of perception would be incomplete because our raters are 
not making investment decisions based on their assessments. Third, although the IPO setting 
provides several advantages for a clean research design, it is not clear whether results learned 
from our chosen setting are generalizable to other settings.  
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Appendix A. Survey design and implementation 
Each survey consisted of an introductory paragraph explaining that they would be rating 
speakers, several demographic questions as discussed in Section 3.3, and then a series of 30-
second videos followed by the competence, trustworthy, and attractiveness rating questions 
portrayed in Figure 2. A practice video and attention check questions were also included, as 
discussed below. When creating the MTurk survey, we employed several techniques common 
in survey design to reduce concerns about bias in the responses. First, we organized CEO 
videos by randomly assigning each video to one of twenty groups or cells, and we then 
randomly assign each of our respondents to view and rate one cell or group of videos. In this 
way, each video is watched by at least 40 respondents (and on average, 45).
36
 In addition, 
respondents were only allowed to view and rate one group of videos, reducing concerns about 
rater fatigue or differences in rater learning over time. Second, within each group of videos, 
we randomized the order of the videos‟ appearance to the respondent to minimize the 
potential for different responses based on when CEO videos are viewed during the rating 
exercise. Third, we randomized the order of the three characteristic questions (Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive) for each rater to avoid systematically different responses due to 
the ordering of the traits. (We did, however, leave the question order the same for all videos 
rated by a given rater to avoid unnecessary confusion during a series of videos and questions.) 
Fourth, we provided a practice video and questions before the sample videos to familiarize 
respondents with the format, and we require raters to confirm their ability to see and hear the 
practice video before allowing the survey to begin. Respondents who respond that they 
                                                          
36
 Respondents are required to view and rate all videos in the group to obtain credit for completing the survey, 
and we receive only complete responses. Thus, the difference in raters per cell is a result of the random 
assignment of raters. On average, each cell will be assigned 45 raters. However, in practice, cells were assigned 
between 43 and 47 raters. Accordingly, all cells (and thus videos) were rated by at least 43 respondents. 
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cannot see or hear the video were not allowed to complete the survey. In addition, during the 
survey, we do not allow the rater to progress to the questions until the time required to view 
the video has elapsed. In this way, we minimize the risk that respondents ignore the video and 
respond with random ratings.
37
  
In addition, we followed the recommendations for maximizing data quality from studies that 
examine the reliability of data originating from MTurk. Specifically, we require that each 
MTurk worker requesting to complete our Human Intelligence Task (HIT) be located in the 
United States and have an approval rating of at least 95% on their previous assignments. We 
also included an attention-check question at both the beginning and the end of the HIT. The 
questions followed the same format as the primary perception questions (with the Likert scale 
as displayed in Figure 2), and consisted of the following text: (First question) Mt. Everest is 
the tallest mountain in the world, measuring 29,029 feet high. On a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Very), how likely is it that Mt. McKinley, a mountain in North America, is taller than Mt. 
Everest? (Second question) Lake Baikal is the deepest lake in the world, at 5,369 feet deep. 
On a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very), how likely is it that Lake Superior, a lake in North 
America, is deeper than Lake Baikal? We perform robustness tests in Section 5 using only 
responses from MTurk workers that correctly answered these attention-check questions. 
Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
Perception CEO-specific average of CEO Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive 
ratings from MTurk survey 
Competent CEO-specific average Competent rating across MTurk raters 
Trustworthy CEO-specific average Trustworthy rating across MTurk raters 
Attractive CEO-specific average Attractive rating across MTurk raters 
L(MVE_Proposed) Log transformation of firm‟s market value of equity calculated using 
the midpoint of the proposed offer price range
38
  
                                                          
37
 Also see robustness tests in Section 5.2 eliminating ratings that are potentially of lower quality. 
38
 As motivated in Section 4.1, we use a log transformation process to determine many of the variables included in the 
study. This transformation consists of taking the log of (1+value) for all positive values and the –log (1-value) for 
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L(MVE_Offer) Log transformation of firm‟s market value of equity calculated at the 
final offer price 
L(MVE_Final) Log transformation of firm‟s market value of equity calculated at the 
close of the firm‟s first day of trading on a public exchange 
Underwriter Average Carter-Manaster ranking of the firm‟s lead underwriters 
Revision Percentage change between firm‟s closing price per share on the first 
day of trading on the secondary market and the midpoint of the 
proposed offer price per share range 
Price_Update Percentage change between firm‟s midpoint of the proposed offer price 
per share range and the final offer price per share 
Initial_Returns Percentage change between firm‟s final offer price per share and the 
closing price per share on the first day of trading on the secondary 
market 
BHAR2Y Firm‟s post-IPO buy-and-hold return over the subsequent two years 
minus the buy-and-hold returns earned by that firm‟s Fama-French 
10x10 portfolio (i.e., the matrix of 100 portfolios formed on deciles for 
the market value of equity and the book-to-market ratio) over the same 
period 
BHARMax Firm‟s abnormal post-IPO buy-and-hold return calculated as above, 
over all subsequent available trading days for each firm through 
December 31, 2015 
ROA2Y Firm‟s average net income divided by their average assets for all 
reported periods during the two years subsequent to the IPO 
ROAMax Firm‟s average net income divided by their average assets for all 
reported periods subsequent to the IPO available for each firm through 
December 31, 2015 
Turnover2Y Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm‟s CEO leaves 
the firm prior to the firm‟s two-year anniversary as a public firm. 
TurnoverMax Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm‟s CEO leaves 
the firm prior to December 31, 2015. 
L(Net_Income) Log transformation of the firm‟s net income for the four quarters prior 
to IPO 
L(R&D_Expense) Log transformation of the firm‟s research and development expense for 
the four quarters prior to IPO 
L(Sales_Growth) Log transformation of the firm‟s change in quarterly revenues prior to 
IPO 
Filing_Size Log transformation of the firm‟s initial filing amount. The initial filing 
amount is calculated by multiplying the final filing amount by the mid-
point of the initially proposed pricing range as a percentage of the final 
offer price 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
negative values. This process is used to retain the negative values included in the original data while also maintaining 
the monotonic relationship that exists among the realized values. 
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Assets Log transformation of the firm‟s total book value of assets for the 
quarter prior to IPO 
Revenues Sum of the firm‟s net income for the four quarters prior to IPO divided 
by the firm‟s total assets for the quarter prior to IPO 
Profitability Sum of the firm‟s net income for the four quarters prior to IPO divided 
by the firm‟s total assets for the quarter prior to IPO 
R&D_Intensity Sum of the firm‟s research and development expense for the four 
quarters prior to IPO divided by the firm‟s total assets for the quarter 
prior to IPO 
Sales_Growth The firm‟s change in quarterly revenues prior to IPO divided by the 
firm‟s total assets for the quarter prior to IPO 
Firm_Age Log transformation of the firm‟s age at IPO 
Uncertainty Percent of words in the firm‟s final registration statement that are in the 
uncertain, negative, or weak modal word lists of Loughran and 
McDonald (2013) 
Tone_Roadshow The difference between the number of positive words and the number 
of negative words in the CEO‟s roadshow presentation divided by the 
total number of words in the CEO‟s presentation, using the Loughran 
and McDonald dictionary 
VC Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has venture-capital backing 
Big4 Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a Big4 auditor at the time 
of the IPO 
Secondary_Shares Percentage of a firm‟s shares being offered that are owned by existing 
shareholders 
Insider_Retention Percentage of a firm‟s total shares that are retained by executives and 
directors after the offering 
Mkt_Cond_Level Average closing price of the NASDAQ composite index (in thousands) 
between the time the firm files its initial registration statement and 
completes its IPO 
Mkt_Cond_Change Average daily percentage change of the NASDAQ composite index 
between the time the firm files its initial registration statement and 
completes its IPO 
Female Indicator variable equal to one if the firm‟s CEO is female 
Foreign Indicator variable equal to one if the firm‟s CEO completed a degree 
from a university located outside of the United States 
CEO_Age Log transformation of the age of the firm‟s CEO at IPO 
Grad_School Indicator variable equal to one if the firm‟s CEO earned a postgraduate 
degree 
Experience Indicator variable equal to one if the previous employer of the firm‟s 
CEO was publicly traded 
Founder Indicator variable equal to one if the firm‟s CEO is the firm‟s founder 
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WHR The width to height ratio of the firm‟s CEO face. This measure is 
calculated as the distance between the upper lip and the highest point of 
the firm‟s eyelids divided by the distance between the left and right 
cheekbones. Refer to Jia et al., (2014) for additional information. 
Live Indicator variable equal to one if the retail roadshow appears to be 
recorded from an actual presentation made to institutional investors  
Sitting Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is sitting during the 
roadshow presentation 
Background Indicator variable equal to one if an investment bank‟s logo is visible in 
the background during the CEO‟s presentation 
Figure 1. IPO Timeline 
 
 
Figure 2. Survey question 
 
Table 1. Final sample 
 
t-2 t-1 t t+1
Firm files registration 
statement with SEC
Initial pricing range 
is announced
The final offer price 
is announced
Price observed on 
secondary market
IPO Roadshow
Panel A: Sample Selection Process
Observations
549
(181)
(68)
(37)
(11)
(28)
224Final Sample
Details
U.S. Firms that completed an original initial public offering between March 24, 
2011 - December 31, 2013.
  Less: Minor offerings (OTC listings or filings less than $10 million)
  Less: Limited Partnerships or Unit offerings
  Less: IPOs with insufficient historical financial information
  Less: Audio-only roadshows, roadshows without manager presentations, 
  or roadshows that were not captured from RetailRoadshow
  Less: Financial registrants (SIC 6xxx)
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Notes: Panel A details our sample selection process and reports the final number of firms included in our 
empirical analyses. Section 3.2 provides additional information about our sample selection process. 
 
 
Notes: Panel B details the distribution of our final sample reporting both the issuing year and Fama-French 
12-industry classification. 
 
Table 2. Mechanical Turk workers 
Panel B: Sample Distribution
Industry 2011 2012 2013 Total
Consumer Non-Durables 1 3 2 6
Consumer Durables 0 1 2 3
Manufacturing 2 5 3 10
Oil & Gas 4 5 4 13
Chemicals 1 0 3 4
Business Equipment 19 28 23 70
Telecommunications 1 1 2 4
Wholesale 7 10 11 28
Healthcare 5 11 36 52
Other 5 8 21 34
Total 45 72 107 224
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Notes: Panel A provides the demographic and background characteristics of the MTurk 
workers that analyzed the CEO presentations in our study. Appendix A provides additional 
information about our use of Amazon‟s Mechanical Turk system.  
 
Table 2. Mechanical Turk workers, continued 
 
Notes: Panel B provides the distribution of ratings provided by Mechanical Turk workers. Appendix A 
provides additional information about the survey techniques used in obtaining these responses. 
Panel A: Characteristics of Mechanical Turk Workers
Frequency Percent
Gender
Male 473 52.6%
Female 427 47.4%
Total 900 100%
Age
18-29 406 45.1%
30-49 378 42.0%
50+ 116 12.9%
Total 900 100%
Education
Some high school or less 9 1.0%
High school graduate or equivalent 112 12.4%
Trade, technical, or vocational training 49 5.4%
Some college credit, no degree 274 30.5%
College graduate 350 38.9%
Some postgraduate work 25 2.8%
Post graduate degree 81 9.0%
Total 900 100%
Ethnicity
Caucasian 662 73.6%
African American 76 8.4%
Asian 66 7.3%
Hispanic 60 6.7%
Other 36 4.0%
Total 900 100%
Panel B: Distribution of ratings provided by Mechanical Turk Workers
Rating Competent Trust Attractive Combined
1 209 468 1,555 2,232
2 438 914 1,699 3,051
3 1,073 1,656 2,146 4,875
4 2,396 2,769 2,573 7,738
5 2,947 2,421 1,366 6,734
6 2,191 1,440 590 4,221
7 822 408 147 1,377
Total 10,076 10,076 10,076 30,228
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Notes: Panel C provides the distribution of rating averages of the 224 CEO presentations included in our 
sample. Each CEO is rated by at least 40 MTurk workers, and we take the average MTurk rating for each 
of the CEO‟s characteristics to create Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. Perception is the average 
of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Panel C: Distribution of rating averages by CEO
Value Perception Competent Trustworthy Attractive
Less than 2.25 0 0 0 6
2.25 - 2.50 0 0 0 24
2.75 - 2.50 0 0 0 20
2.75 - 3.00 0 0 0 34
3.00 - 3.25 5 0 0 37
3.25 - 3.50 12 0 11 24
3.50 - 3.75 39 0 24 28
3.75 - 4.00 41 5 50 17
4.00 - 4.25 57 20 50 13
4.25 - 4.50 41 39 43 8
4.50 - 4.75 21 55 27 8
4.75 - 5.00 8 53 13 5
5.00 - 5.25 0 44 6 0
Greater than 5.25 0 8 0 0
Total 224 224 224 224
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Notes: Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of firms. The data used in this 
study is collected from a variety of sources including Compustat, CRSP, SDC Platinum, the 
SEC EDGAR database, and Jay Ritter‟s IPO database. The motivations and descriptions for 
all variables appear in both Section 4 and Appendix B of this paper. 
Table 4. Perception and firm value 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Q1 Median Q3
Perception 224 4.05 0.39 3.76 4.09 4.32
Competent 224 4.72 0.36 4.47 4.73 4.98
Trustworthy 224 4.16 0.42 3.86 4.13 4.47
Attractive 224 3.28 0.66 2.80 3.18 3.73
L(MVE_Proposed) 224 6.54 0.98 5.81 6.31 7.15
L(MVE_Offer) 224 6.51 1.07 5.82 6.34 7.16
L(MVE_Final) 224 6.68 1.12 5.94 6.58 7.34
Underwriter 224 8.25 0.86 8.00 8.50 8.75
Revision 224 0.24 0.54 -0.16 0.12 0.51
Price_Update 224 -0.01 0.23 -0.17 0.00 0.13
Initial_Returns 224 0.21 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.32
L(Book_Value) 224 4.61 2.48 4.33 4.87 5.71
L(Revenues) 224 4.83 2.17 3.99 4.94 6.09
L(Net_Income) 224 -0.38 3.33 -3.24 -1.54 2.89
L(R&D_Intensity) 224 2.00 1.60 0.00 2.46 3.16
L(Sales_Growth) 224 1.50 3.23 0.00 2.21 3.81
Assets 224 5.26 1.71 4.03 4.90 6.40
Firm_Age 224 2.62 0.89 2.08 2.48 3.16
Uncertainty 224 3.77 0.41 3.50 3.74 4.06
Tone_Roadshow 224 1.33 0.82 0.76 1.33 1.86
VC 224 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Filing_Size 224 5.02 0.81 4.40 4.78 5.42
Big4 224 0.88 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00
Secondary_Shares 224 0.15 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.20
Insider_Retention 224 0.41 0.25 0.17 0.45 0.59
Mkt_Cond_Level 224 3.12 0.42 2.75 3.00 3.48
Mkt_Cond_Change 224 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.14
Female 224 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign 224 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
CEO_Age 224 3.93 0.15 3.84 3.95 4.04
Grad_School 224 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00
Experience 224 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Founder 224 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
WHR 224 2.08 0.16 1.95 2.06 2.18
Live 224 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Sitting 224 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Background 224 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Notes: Table 4, Panel A presents the results from an OLS regression of firm value at three points in the IPO process on various 
CEO, firm, and offering characteristics. Perception, defined as the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive, is the 
primary variable of interest. L(MVE_Proposed) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the 
proposed offer price. L(MVE_Offer) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the final offer 
price. L(MVE_Final) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated at the end of its first day trading on 
the secondary market. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 
industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 4. Perception and firm value, continued 
Panel A: Aggregate Perception and Firm Value
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Prediction L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final)
Perception + 0.2793*** 0.3244*** 0.4050***
(2.99) (3.00) (3.54)
L(Book_Value) 0.0328*** 0.0533*** 0.0609***
(2.81) (4.06) (3.56)
L(Revenues) 0.3063*** 0.3122*** 0.3018***
(3.12) (3.42) (3.96)
L(Net_Income) -0.0140 -0.0205 -0.0160
(-0.73) (-0.99) (-0.70)
L(R&D_Expense) 0.1348*** 0.1269*** 0.1435***
(4.73) (5.43) (6.37)
L(Sales_Growth) 0.0294** 0.0321** 0.0362**
(2.34) (2.22) (2.23)
Firm_Age -0.0285 -0.0478 -0.0686
(-0.27) (-0.46) (-0.65)
Uncertainty -0.2819** -0.2573* -0.2696
(-2.38) (-1.76) (-1.63)
Tone_Roadshow 0.0477 0.0925** 0.1121*
(1.14) (1.99) (1.83)
Underwriter 0.0881*** 0.1180*** 0.1137***
(3.20) (4.82) (3.28)
VC 0.0691 0.0582 0.0615
(0.60) (0.50) (0.52)
Big4 0.2003*** 0.2897*** 0.3465***
(2.62) (3.75) (4.58)
Secondary_Shares 0.4286** 0.4430** 0.4892**
(2.56) (2.18) (2.59)
Insider_Retention -0.4243* -0.3200 -0.1487
(-1.85) (-1.32) (-0.51)
Mkt_Cond_Level 0.6093*** 0.5788*** 0.6166***
(4.11) (3.96) (4.14)
Female -0.2327 -0.3496 -0.4503*
(-1.00) (-1.42) (-1.88)
Foreign 0.0608 -0.0103 -0.0098
(0.75) (-0.08) (-0.06)
CEO_Age 0.3120 0.4443** 0.4272
(1.35) (2.25) (1.45)
Grad_School -0.0820 -0.1158 -0.1323
(-1.17) (-1.32) (-1.21)
Experience 0.1699** 0.1755** 0.1930**
(2.14) (1.98) (1.97)
Founder 0.1422 0.1569 0.1883*
(1.46) (1.55) (1.72)
WHR -0.4042** -0.5706** -0.5761**
(-2.18) (-2.18) (-2.18)
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224
Adjusted R-Squared 0.626 0.621 0.581
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Notes: Table 4, Panel B presents the results from an OLS regression of firm value at three points in the IPO process on various 
CEO, firm, and offering characteristics. The individual components of Perception, (Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive) 
are the primary variables of interest and, along with all other variables, are as defined in Appendix B. L(MVE_Proposed) is the 
natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the proposed offer price. L(MVE_Offer) is the natural 
log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the final offer price. L(MVE_Final) is defined as the natural 
log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated at the end of its first day trading on the secondary market. 
Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses 
below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 5. Perception and underwriter matching 
Panel B: Perception Components and Firm Value
VARIABLES Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Competent + 0.2457** 0.2461** 0.3174**
(2.37) (2.21) (2.42)
Trustworthy + 0.1305* 0.1252 0.1706
(1.84) (1.44) (1.45)
Attractive + 0.1657*** 0.2257*** 0.2764***
(3.22) (3.65) (4.51)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.624 0.619 0.625 0.617 0.613 0.624 0.575 0.569 0.583
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final)
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Notes: Table 5 presents the results from an OLS regression of Underwriter on various CEO, firm, and offering characteristics. 
Underwriter is the average Carter-Manaster IPO ranking for the firm‟s lead underwriters. Perception is the average of Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-
French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 6. Perception and IPO price revision 
VARIABLES Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception + 0.3066**
(2.32)
Competent + 0.3868***
(3.39)
Trust + 0.2299**
(2.08)
Attractive + 0.1090
(1.25)
Assets 0.1206 0.1212 0.1116 0.1235
(1.17) (1.14) (1.10) (1.24)
Revenues -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0050 0.0104
(-0.01) (0.01) (-0.06) (0.13)
Profitability 0.3906** 0.3911** 0.3815** 0.3851**
(2.44) (2.40) (2.35) (2.41)
R&D_Intensity 0.2000 0.2027 0.1908 0.2089
(0.91) (0.94) (0.84) (0.95)
Sales_Growth 0.1225 0.1266 0.1413 0.1319
(0.82) (0.85) (0.90) (0.90)
Firm_Age 0.0423 0.0300 0.0403 0.0521
(0.97) (0.69) (0.88) (1.15)
VC 0.3635*** 0.3658*** 0.3536*** 0.3740***
(3.30) (3.46) (3.23) (3.37)
Filing_Size 0.1596 0.1506 0.1746 0.1717
(1.13) (1.10) (1.26) (1.24)
Big4 0.6399* 0.6651** 0.6435** 0.6178*
(1.97) (2.12) (1.99) (1.86)
Secondary_Shares 0.1569 0.1851 0.1801 0.0999
(1.04) (1.28) (1.25) (0.62)
Insider_Retention 0.4971** 0.4891** 0.4819** 0.4955**
(2.46) (2.51) (2.23) (2.51)
Female -0.0129 0.0414 0.0068 0.0701
(-0.12) (0.48) (0.06) (0.78)
Foreign -0.1513 -0.1481 -0.1570 -0.1796
(-0.88) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-1.07)
CEO_Age 0.1226 -0.0172 -0.0899 0.0255
(0.34) (-0.06) (-0.29) (0.06)
Grad_School 0.0951 0.0896 0.1050 0.1115
(1.18) (1.16) (1.34) (1.35)
Experience 0.1299* 0.1321* 0.1451* 0.1143*
(1.85) (1.92) (1.96) (1.70)
Founder -0.0775 -0.0828 -0.0892 -0.0945
(-1.09) (-1.26) (-1.24) (-1.25)
WHR -0.6347 -0.6343 -0.7034 -0.6560
(-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.17) (-1.05)
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.352 0.339 0.333
Underwriter
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Notes: Table 6 presents the results from an OLS regression of price changes associated with the IPO process on various CEO, firm, 
and offering characteristics. Revision is the percentage change between the price per share initially proposed for the offering and the 
closing price per share after its first day of trading on the secondary market. Price_Update is the percentage change between the 
price per share initially proposed for the offering and the final offer price. Underpricing is the percentage change between the final 
offer price and the IPO firm‟s closing price per share after its first day of trading on the secondary market. Perception is the average 
of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered 
by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-
tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 7. Perception and Uncertainty 
Revision Price_Update Initial_Returns
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Perception 0.2205*** 0.0578 0.1107*
(2.70) (1.34) (1.84)
Assets -0.1900** -0.0724** -0.0820*
(-2.01) (-2.35) (-1.66)
Revenues -0.0598 -0.0203 -0.0262
(-1.06) (-1.08) (-0.76)
Profitability 0.1534*** 0.0332* 0.0799*
(2.69) (1.68) (1.94)
R&D_Intensity -0.3180** -0.2065*** -0.1006
(-2.46) (-4.89) (-1.42)
Sales_Growth 0.0329 0.0335 -0.0106
(0.18) (0.63) (-0.11)
Firm_Age -0.0340 0.0029 -0.0263
(-0.81) (0.23) (-1.00)
Uncertainty 0.0064 0.0129 -0.0042
(0.06) (0.22) (-0.08)
Tone_Roadshow 0.0727 0.0296 0.0325
(1.54) (1.60) (1.18)
Underwriter 0.0273 0.0179 0.0067
(0.83) (1.58) (0.35)
VC 0.0596 0.0293 0.0313
(0.83) (0.98) (0.74)
Filing_Size 0.1812 0.0827 0.0626
(1.24) (1.52) (0.94)
Big4 0.2822*** 0.1166*** 0.1154**
(4.90) (4.40) (2.30)
Secondary_Shares 0.0390 -0.0023 0.0476
(0.59) (-0.05) (1.03)
Insider_Retention 0.2413* 0.0810 0.1573*
(1.73) (1.42) (1.83)
Mkt_Cond_Change 1.1544** 0.3258 0.6551***
(2.17) (1.12) (3.92)
Female -0.3147*** -0.1174 -0.1291***
(-3.26) (-1.57) (-3.39)
Foreign -0.0442 -0.0506 0.0045
(-0.50) (-0.89) (0.10)
CEO_Age 0.1931 0.1102 0.0284
(0.95) (1.19) (0.17)
Grad_School -0.0994 -0.0363* -0.0295
(-1.21) (-1.77) (-0.60)
Experience 0.1132 0.0340 0.0561
(1.31) (1.09) (1.21)
Founder 0.0114 0.0123 0.0158
(0.14) (0.23) (0.48)
WHR -0.4802*** -0.2990*** -0.1255
(-2.73) (-3.42) (-1.22)
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.248 0.272 0.159
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Notes: Table 7 presents the results from an OLS regression of firms‟ IPO outcomes on various CEO, firm, and offering 
characteristics. Perception is defined as the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. High_Uncertain is an indicator 
variable equal to one for firms in the top quintile of uncertain language in the S-1. The interaction of these two variables, 
Perception * High_Uncertain, is the primary variable of interest. L(MVE_Proposed) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of 
common equity calculated using the proposed offer price. L(MVE_Offer) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common 
equity calculated using the final offer price. L(MVE_Final) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity 
calculated at the end of its first day trading on the secondary market. Underwriter is the average Carter-Manaster IPO ranking for 
the firm‟s lead underwriters. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-
French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
Table 8. Perception: Measurement using Videos or Pictures 
  
Notes: Table 8, Panel A presents the results from an OLS regression of firms‟ IPO outcomes on various CEO, firm, and offering 
characteristics. L(MVE_Proposed) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the proposed 
offer price. L(MVE_Offer) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the final offer price. 
L(MVE_Final) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated at the end of its first day trading on the 
secondary market. Underwriter is the average Carter-Manaster IPO ranking for the firm‟s lead underwriters. Perception is the 
average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive (based on surveys using videos of the CEO). Perception_Pic is the CEO-specific 
average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive ratings obtained from a MTurk survey that showed survey participants a picture 
of the CEO. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and 
year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 
** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception * High_Uncertain 0.3510 0.5164** 0.5417** 0.5283*
(1.64) (2.38) (2.40) (1.86)
Perception 0.1663* 0.1774 0.2538* 0.1924
(1.83) (1.53) (1.71) (1.23)
High_Uncertain -1.3149 -1.9433** -2.0715** -2.0307*
(-1.47) (-2.20) (-2.25) (-1.79)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.621 0.621 0.580 0.345
Panel A: Multiple Measures of Aggregate Perception and IPO Outcomes
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception 0.1843* 0.2477** 0.3046** 0.3046**
(1.77) (2.11) (2.37) (2.37)
Perception_Pic 0.2166* 0.1749 0.2291 0.2291
(1.79) (1.34) (1.53) (1.53)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
R-squared 0.630 0.623 0.584 0.340
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Notes: Table 8, Panel B presents the results from an OLS regression of firms‟ IPO outcomes on various CEO, firm, and offering 
characteristics. L(MVE_Proposed) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the proposed 
offer price. L(MVE_Offer) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated using the final offer price. 
L(MVE_Final) is the natural log of the firm‟s market value of common equity calculated at the end of its first day trading on the 
secondary market. Underwriter is the average Carter-Manaster IPO ranking for the firm‟s lead underwriters. Perception_Pic is the 
CEO-specific average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive ratings obtained from a MTurk survey that showed survey 
participants a picture of the CEO. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-
French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
   
Table 9. Perception and Post-IPO performance 
 
Notes: Table 9, Panel A presents the results from an OLS regression of post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal returns on various CEO, 
firm, and offering characteristics. BHAR2Y is the firm‟s buy-and-hold return over the two years following the close of its first day of 
trading minus the buy-and-hold returns earned by that firm‟s Fama-French 10x10 portfolio over the same period. BHARMax is the 
firm‟s buy-and-hold return for all days subsequent to the first day of trading for each firm through December 31, 2015 minus the 
buy-and-hold returns earned by that firm‟s Fama-French 10x10 portfolio over the same period. Perception is the average of 
Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by 
Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
 
Panel B: Aggregate Perception formed from a CEO's Picture and IPO Outcomes
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception_Pic 0.2865** 0.2689** 0.3446** 0.1284
(2.49) (2.13) (2.49) (0.79)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
R-squared 0.628 0.619 0.579 0.332
Panel A: Perception and Subsequent Stock Returns
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception 0.1556 0.0701 0.0311 0.1614
(1.12) (0.32) (0.16) (0.64)
Remaining Controls Excluded Included Excluded Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
R-squared 0.033 0.104 0.090 0.170
BHAR 2Y BHAR Max
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Notes: Table 9, Panel B presents the results from an OLS regression of post-IPO CEO turnover on various CEO, firm, and offering 
characteristics. Turnover2Y is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm‟s CEO exits the firm prior to the two-year 
anniversary of the firm‟s initial public offering. TurnoverMax is defined similarly but extends the time period under consideration 
through December 31, 2015. Perception is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all other 
variable definitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
Table 9. Perception and Post-IPO performance, continued 
 
Notes: Table 9, Panel C presents the results from an OLS regression of post-IPO operating performance on various CEO, firm, and 
offering characteristics. ROA2Y is the firm‟s average quarterly net income divided by average quarterly total assets subsequent to its 
IPO. ROAMax is defined similarly but includes data for all quarters subsequent to each firm‟s IPO through December 31, 2015. 
Perception is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all other variable definitions. Standard 
errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 10. Determinants of Perception 
Panel B: Perception and Subsequent CEO Turnover
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception 0.0094 -0.0271 -0.1145** -0.1598*
(0.15) (-0.27) (-2.15) (-1.82)
Remaining Controls Excluded Included Excluded Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
R-squared 0.006 0.018 0.023 0.016
Turnover 2Y Turnover Max
Panel C: Perception and Subsequent Operating Performance
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0009 0.0013
(-0.32) (-0.25) (-0.18) (0.15)
Remaining Controls Excluded Included Excluded Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
R-squared 0.368 0.486 0.316 0.463
ROA 2Y ROA Max
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Notes: Table 10, Panel A presents the results from an OLS regression of Perception on various CEO, firm, and 
offering characteristics. Perception is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive. See Appendix B for all 
other variable definitions. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 10. Determinants of Perception, continued 
Panel A: Determinants of Aggregate Perception
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.5043*** 0.4645***
(5.62) (5.16)
Foreign -0.1074* -0.1257*
(-1.76) (-1.87)
CEO_Age -1.2011*** -1.1647***
(-7.97) (-6.84)
Grad_School 0.0783 0.0929*
(1.60) (1.76)
Experience -0.0384 -0.0356
(-0.83) (-0.72)
Founder -0.1242** -0.1275**
(-2.59) (-2.44)
WHR -0.3059** -0.3368**
(-2.23) (-2.43)
Live 0.0009 0.0853
(0.02) (1.48)
Sitting -0.1555 -0.0825
(-1.36) (-0.79)
Background -0.0775 -0.1858***
(-1.07) (-2.65)
Tone_Roadshow 0.0254 0.0251
(0.83) (0.69)
Assets 0.0030 0.0175
(0.13) (0.85)
Profitability -0.0815 -0.0464
(-1.29) (-0.70)
R&D_Inten -0.0070 0.0425
(-0.06) (0.37)
Sales_Growth 0.0969 0.1064
(1.20) (1.60)
Firm_Age 0.0323 0.0268
(0.92) (0.84)
VC 0.0866 0.0721
(1.07) (1.10)
Industry Fixed Effects Excluded Excluded Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.249 0.006 0.022 0.272
Perception
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
 
Notes: Table 10, Panel B presents the results from an OLS regression of the individual 
components of Perception (Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive) on various CEO, firm, 
and offering characteristics. See Appendix B for all variable definitions. T-statistics are 
provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
Table 11. Additional tests    
Panel B: Determinants of Perception Components
Competent Trustworthy Attractive
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.2343** 0.5310*** 0.6155***
(2.42) (5.75) (4.72)
Foreign -0.0860 -0.1721** -0.1167
(-1.18) (-2.10) (-1.09)
CEO_Age -0.5382*** -0.6506*** -2.3284***
(-3.15) (-3.42) (-9.12)
Grad_School 0.0921* 0.0812 0.1164
(1.79) (1.38) (1.44)
Experience -0.0257 -0.1159** 0.0406
(-0.51) (-2.02) (0.54)
Founder -0.0737 -0.1191** -0.1939**
(-1.36) (-2.03) (-2.34)
WHR -0.2626* -0.1075 -0.6327***
(-1.88) (-0.65) (-2.66)
Live 0.1327** 0.0968 0.0309
(2.45) (1.60) (0.33)
Sitting -0.0641 -0.0678 -0.1225
(-0.73) (-0.68) (-0.72)
Background -0.0536 -0.2770*** -0.2217*
(-0.82) (-4.29) (-1.80)
Tone_Roadshow 0.0292 0.0315 0.0145
(0.78) (0.75) (0.25)
Assets 0.0163 0.0215 0.0146
(0.82) (0.94) (0.43)
Profitability -0.0532 -0.0262 -0.0593
(-0.91) (-0.39) (-0.54)
R&D_Inten 0.0151 0.0710 0.0336
(0.14) (0.53) (0.20)
Sales_Growth 0.0753 0.0788 0.1667
(1.18) (1.15) (1.54)
Firm_Age 0.0412 0.0386 -0.0066
(1.35) (1.16) (-0.12)
VC 0.0474 0.1046 0.0467
(0.74) (1.38) (0.47)
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 0.145 0.358
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Notes: Table 11, Panel A presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) restricting the sample to 
exclude the 8 firms with female CEOs. Perception is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and 
Attractive. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics 
are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 
1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
  
   
Notes: Table 11, Panel B presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include each of 
the individual components of Perception (Competent, Trustworthy, and Attractive) in each of the 
regressions. These three variables are as defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are double-clustered by 
Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. 
*** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
Table 12. Robustness tests using alternative measures of Perception 
Panel A: Primary Results Excluding Female CEOs
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception 0.2839*** 0.3368*** 0.4195*** 0.3006**
(2.95) (3.08) (3.62) (2.19)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 216 216 216 216
Adjusted R-squared 0.627 0.621 0.578 0.338
Panel B: Primary Results Including All Three Perception Components
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Competent 0.2729 0.2477 0.3077* 0.4779*
(1.32) (1.36) (1.74) (1.77)
Trust -0.1223 -0.1471 -0.1631 -0.1123
(-0.83) (-1.01) (-1.05) (-0.47)
Attractive 0.1263*** 0.1994*** 0.2385*** 0.0161
(2.83) (4.57) (5.05) (0.16)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.624 0.622 0.582 0.346
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Notes: Table 12, Panel A presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include 
Perception_Recognized rather than Perception. Perception_Recognized is the average of Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive after excluding all ratings that indicated recognition of the CEO. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses 
below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
 
   
Notes: Table 12, Panel B presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include 
Perception_Attention rather than Perception. Perception_Attention is the average of Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive after excluding all raters that did not correctly answer the two attention-check 
questions included in the survey. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and 
year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed 
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 12. Robustness tests using alternative measures of Perception, continued 
Panel A: Robustness - Recognized the speaker
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception Recognized 0.2863*** 0.3308*** 0.4132*** 0.3067**
(2.99) (2.97) (3.50) (2.34)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.622 0.582 0.343
Ratings Retained 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3%
Panel B: Robustness - Incorrectly answered the attention check questions
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception Attention 0.2567*** 0.2956*** 0.3761*** 0.3250**
(2.73) (2.76) (3.37) (2.52)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.625 0.620 0.580 0.346
Ratings Retained 84.4% 84.4% 84.4% 84.4%
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Notes: Table 12, Panel C presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include 
Perception_Constant rather than Perception. Perception_Constant is the average of Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive after excluding all raters from MTurk workers that indicated the same value for 
a characteristic for each of the videos that they rated. Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 
48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates 
two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
   
Notes: Table 12, Panel D presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include 
Perception_Uncorrelated rather than Perception. Perception_Uncorrelated is the average of Competent, 
Trustworthy, and Attractive after excluding all raters whose responses were uncorrelated with the group 
average (p-value < 0.10). Standard errors are double-clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. 
T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical 
significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Table 12. Robustness tests using alternative measures of Perception, continued 
   
Panel C: Robustness - Provided a constant rating
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception Constant 0.2713*** 0.3164*** 0.3927*** 0.3047**
(2.89) (2.85) (3.39) (2.35)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.621 0.581 0.344
Ratings Retained 94.2% 94.2% 94.2% 94.2%
Panel D: Robustness - Uncorrelated to the average rating
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception Uncorrelated 0.2728*** 0.3161*** 0.3914*** 0.2638**
(2.75) (2.92) (3.53) (2.19)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.626 0.622 0.582 0.341
Ratings Retained 93.3% 93.3% 93.3% 93.3%
Panel E: Robustness - Violated criteria specified in Panels A-D
L(MVE_Proposed) L(MVE_Offer) L(MVE_Final) Underwriter
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Perception Net 0.2320** 0.2645** 0.3312*** 0.2571**
(2.40) (2.49) (3.12) (2.34)
Remaining Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Time Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Observations 224 224 224 224
Adjusted R-squared 0.625 0.620 0.579 0.342
Ratings Retained 74.5% 74.5% 74.5% 74.5%
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Notes: Table 12, Panel E presents the results from running Eq. (1) and (2) modified to include 
Perception_Net rather than Perception. Perception_Net is the average of Competent, Trustworthy, and 
Attractive after excluding all ratings that were excluded in Panels A-D. Standard errors are double-
clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and year-week. T-statistics are provided in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *** designates two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
